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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes military expenditure patterns for the
East European members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The
study examines data using a cross-sectional methodology for
1966 and 1974, and a longitudinal methodology for the period
1960-1974.
Non-parametric statistical methods as well as correlation
and regression analysis are used to uncover the various factors
most influential in WTO defense budgeting, both region-wide and
for specific member countries.
Forecasting models are developed for use in predicting
military expenditures for individual countries as well as the
"typical" WTO country. A general discussion of model use with
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The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) was formed on 14 May
195 5 when the leaders of the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic (GDR) , Hungary,
Poland and Rumania met in Warsaw for the signing of the Warsaw
Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance [1].
The alliance was reduced to seven countries with the defection
of Albania in September 1968 [2]. However, the real corner-
stone of the Soviet military-political power in Eastern Europe
is the network of bilateral treaties with the so-called WTO
nations . In describing the importance of these treaties
Erickson [2] states:
"What these treaties insure is direct Soviet
control over security affairs in Eastern
Europe: equally, even if both 'military blocs'
(NATO and the Warsaw Pact) were 'dissolved'
,
which is one of the political formulations
frequently advanced, this would have little
effect on the Soviet Union's security arrange-
ment in Eastern Europe at large."
Hence the WTO was not established as a military alliance
but more as a political response to NATO. In essence, the WTO
provided a formal organization through which the Soviet leaders
could direct, control and co-ordinate the political, military
and economic assets of Eastern Europe while legalizing the
permanent stationing of Soviet troops in the region. The
Soviets also hoped to reduce the visible signs of Kremlin
11

domination over Eastern Europe by giving the WTO the appear-
ance of a multi-lateral forum of independent nations while
also guaranteeing the area as a Soviet buffer zone.
Historically, the WTO has been treated by Western analysts
as a dormant organization used by the Kremlin to organize
Eastern European support for Soviet policies. This is evident
in the unevenness of the literature on NATO and the WTO.
There has been a constant flow of scholarly writings on NATO
while only a pittance of informed writings on the WTO. This
occurred primarily because Western analysts have been pre-
occupied with the subject of strategic and nuclear forces,
weapons and postures which tended to exclude the conventional
forces in Eastern Europe. The situation has changed in recent
years, for as the vitality and influence of NATO has declined,
a steady increase in WTO forces , -weapons and capability has
raised the fears of Western leaders.
B. PROBLEMS
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a quantitative
study of WTO military expenditures so as to expose the under-
lying factors which most influence the defense policies for
each of the six Eastern European members. The difficulty of
the task is complicated by the lack of reliable data. Unlike
Western countries where statistics on the National Budget
,
Gross National Product, Industrial Output, Trade, Balance of
Payments, etc. are accurately reported, WTO countries treat
such accounts as state secrets. This is not to say that
12

official statistics are not published, but too frequently they
are stagnant values repeated from one year to the next. To
gain a true perspective of the problems, successes or failures
in the various categories, Western analysts have turned to
examining available data and intelligence for use in estimating
the actual values. The estimation of military expenditures
or Gross National Product is not a highly refined process.
Many times the methodology is crude and estimates from different
analysts vary substantially. Another formidable problem is the
use of suitable exchange rates for the conversion of domestic
currency to U.S. dollars so that real changes in the process
are not shielded or exacerbated by the effects of inflation on
Western currencies. The fact that Eastern European currencies
are not readily exchangeable for Western currencies has provoked
further analysis in the areas of purchasing power parities. It
is true that official exchange rates exist, but these frequently
overvalue the local currency. There is also the problem of com-
paring estimates of different phenomenon such as military
expenditures and Gross National Product. Frequently different
exchange rates and price deflators are applied which make the
two dollar values incompatible when used together.
Thus, two basic problems are confronted: 1) Extracting
from the data those factors which play the major role in defense
policy decisions in individual countries, and 2) using the
different data sources and other available information to set





The intent of this thesis is to uncover the underlying
factors that influence WTO defense spending. To accomplish
this the various data sources are examined and the broadest,
most consistent sources chosen for use .in the analysis. A
cross-sectional analysis is then performed across the seven
WTO nations where correlations, between military spending and
each of four variables, hypothesized to have an explanatory
effect, are computed. This is done for two years; 19 6 6 and
1974. Then regression is used to construct predictive models
for the "typical" WTO country. The cross-sectional analysis
is concluded with a brief investigation of various ratio
variables which enable a rank ordering of WTO countries in
three categories: 1) Economic burden of Defense Spending,
MX/GNP; 2) Economic wealth or ability to pay for defense,
GNP/POP, and 3) Militarization, NMILT/POP.
The longitudinal analysis follows by first investigating
the relationship between conformity to Soviet defense policy
and 1) trade dependence of individual WTO members on the USSR,
2) economic development of European members, and 3) suscepti-
bility of European members to Soviet military intervention.
This is accomplished by constructing various indices of conform-
ity from the time series data. Then non-parametric statistical
methods are used to compute correlations and test the results
for significance. The longitudinal analysis concluded with a
thorough examination of each of the six European members defense
14

spending history and a set of 31-33 economic and military
variables hypothesized to carry explanatory effects. Correla-
tion analysis is used to sort the 31-33 variables into rank
order statistics where comparisons of correlates between
sources can be made. Predictive models are constructed for
each source using regression analysis thus enabling the analyst
to forecast military expenditures for specific countries.
The author utilized various computer programs in the
analysis. APL programs for Least Squares Regression, Smoothing
and plotting were developed by McNeil [3]. APL programs for
computation of Pearson correlations, the Hildreth-Lu Grid
Search and Generalized Differencing procedures as well as a
Fortran program for multiple stepwise regression were developed
by Professor F.R. Richards of the Naval Postgraduate School.
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used
in computing all Spearman and Kendall Correlations. The list
of acronyms and abbreviations used in this thesis can be found





A. MILITARY EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES
Determining military expenditures for the WTO countries
is a special problem because a) their large arsenal of sophis-
ticated weaponry and manpower resources clearly makes them
major military powers, and b) the published defense budget is
relatively small and unreal for such a force. The true cost
of fielding such a force is a closely guarded state secret
known only to the most senior military and political officials.
NATO policy-makers need valid measures of the WTO defense
budget in order to assess Pact objectives, priorities and capa-
bilities. For this reason, various methodologies have appeared
for use in estimating the actual cost of the WTO defense pro-
gram. These estimation methods generally fall into three
categories: 1) The CIA Direct Costing Approach; 2) The Stanford
Research Institute (SRI) Approach and 3) The W.T. Lee Approach.
Reference 4- gives a good account of all three methods as applied
to estimates of USSR military expenditures.
1
. CIA Direct Costing Methodology
A description of the CIA Direct Costing Methodology as
applied to the USSR was given in 1974 by the then CIA Director
William E. Colby, to the Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee





"This procedure involves identifying Soviet
military programs, estimating the magnitude
or the quantities involved in each program,
and then applying estimated individual prices
to each quantity. All Soviet military activi-
ties other than the military research and
development figure are estimated by this pro-
cedure and are thus independent of the
published spending figure." [M-]
In essence, the Direct Cost Methodology attempts to
make a detailed list of all identifiable assets, components
and activities that make up the defense program. In the CIA
estimates for the USSR this listing is broken down into five
components: 1) Procurement (PC); 2) Personnel Pay and Main-
tenance (PPM); 3) Operations and Maintenance (OSM); 4) Military
Construction (MC), and 5) Research, Development, Testing and
Evaluation (RDTSE) and Space. Each component is costed sepa-
rately and then summed to reach the final Budget Estimate (BE).
The following is the basic Direct Cost Model.
5 .
BE = V* V^ p Q..=Quantity of unit j
2^i 2-i ^3 ij •
J of component i
i=l j=l P..=Price or Cost of unit j
~" of component i
n. =Total number of unit items
in component i
Each of the components in the Direct Cost Model rely on
either the known P in local currency, or the estimated P costed
at U.S. prices, and then converted to local currency. The CIA
uses known values of P for PPM and MC, and estimates of P for
PC and OSM. The following discussion gives a brief sketch of




Estimate the cost using known or estimated perfor-
mance parameters by applying one of the following methods:
(1) Assign a Comparable Cost
Use the existing cost of a comparable U.S.
system. This method provides a rough approximation to the
cost and is not normally used unless a quick estimate is needed.
(2) CER f s
Use Cost Estimating Relationships (CER's) for
various components and sub-systems of the item. This gives
components costs which can be summed to yield system cost (e.g.,
Ruble Cost of Aircraft = Engine cost + Airframe cost + Avionics
cost ) •
(3) U.S. Procurement Cost
Develop the cost of producing the system in the
U.S. to USSR specifications and in the quantities produced by
the USSR.
b. PPM and MC
Personnel Pay and Maintenance and Military Construc-
tion are the strongest part of the Direct Costing Methodology.
Pay scales for military personnel are known and applied to
estimated force manning in local currency. In Military Construc-
tion, there is detailed information available on the physical
construction of military facilities. Hence these items can be




Local prices are used in costing Operations and
Maintenance if known, otherwise estimates are made using dollar
prices or percentage factors (i.e., cost/flight hour, cost/
square foot, etc.).
d. RDT £ E and Space
No direct costing is applied in RDT £ E and Space.
The CIA accepts the published budget figure with certain minor
modification.
e. Summary Direct Costing
(1) All known items in the defense program are
listed in five component areas.
(2) Unit costs are assigned using local currency
(if P known) or dollars (if P unknown) and then converted to
local currency.
(3) Costs are multiplied by quantities and summed
to yield the final budget estimate.
The final budget estimate is then a combination of
local currency values (when P is known) and dollar values (when
P is unknown and estimated by P.. „ ) . There is no doubt that
errors of varying magnitude can result depending on the degree
of uncertainty surrounding the systems, and of course the care
to which the analyst employs the methods of estimation.
2
. Stanford Research Institute Methodology
The SRI Methodology accepts the published budget figure
for Defense and supplements this figure with estimates thought
19

to be military spending hidden in other budget categories. For
example, in the case of the USSR, the SRI
"...has accepted the published 'Defense'
appropriation and 'Science' expenditures
as total USSR outlays for National Security
Expenditures (NSE) and for Civilian R S D."
[5]
Thus, the SRI estimate is simply the total of the pub-
lished Defense budget plus a percentage (50-100%) of the Science
budget
.
It is not surprising that many Western analysts are
dubious of the SRI estimates. W.T. Lee [4] claims much evi-
dence is available suggesting that the published figures cover
only PPM, S M and MC
.
a. Summary SRI Methodology
(1) Budget estimate equals published Defense
expenditures plus a percentage of other budget categories
thought to contain military items.
3. W.T. Lee Methodology
The methodology developed by Lee emphasizes officially
published data. For example, Lee's estimates for the USSR are
based entirely on statistics published by the Soviet Union.
Lee estimates total defense spending as the sum of
three components: 1) National Security Durables (tanks, guns,
ships, aircraft , missiles , etc.), 2) Personnel Pay and Mainten-
ance, Operations and Maintenance, and Military Construction,
and 3) Military RDT S E and Space.
20

Lee estimates the NS Durables procurred (in his USSR
estimate) by examining
"...published data on machinery and equipment
output and allocation thereof to investment
and consumption, and the ratios of final demand
to gross output from the 1959 and 1966 Input-
Output (10) tables as constructed by US
scholars." [4]
Uniformed personnel costs come directly from published
sources while he uses budget figures (Defense less Uniformed
Pay) to represent the S M and MC costs. The RDT S E and
Space figures are estimated in two ways:
"...1) by calculating an approximate value
of the output of proto-types and space hard-
ware, and then estimating the other components
of R S D, and 2) by summing labor, capital and
material inputs to the RDT 6 E performing
institutions." [M-]
a. Summary Lee Methodology
(1) Uses published data for three components (NS
Durables, 8 M and MC , and Military RDT S E and Space).
(2) Uses economic techniques such as input-output
tables to estimate production rates, capacities, etc.




Table I contains ruble estimates of USSR defense
spending for 1970 and 1975 utilizing the methodologies of the
CIA, SRI and W.T. Lee. The CIA figures reflect the 19 76




USSR DEFENSE SPENDING (bil Rubles) [4]
1970 1975
CIA 45-50 . 55 - 60
SRI 21 -24 22 - 26
LEE 42.5-49.0 66.5-76.0
There appears some measure of consistency between the
CIA and Lee estimate. The SRI estimates are roughly 50% of
the other two estimates. This result can provide some support
for the Direct Costing Method and perhaps dispel the conten-
tion that published data has no useful purpose in the estimation
of budget totals
.
B. SOURCES AND ESTIMATION METHODS
In reviewing available literature on WTO defense spending,
the major focus appears to be on the Soviet Union. The CIA,
SRI and Lee methodologies were all developed to estimate USSR
expenditures but the same techniques are also applied to
Eastern Europe.
Data on WTO military spending is generally available from
three different sources: 1) The U.S. Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency (ACDA) ; 2) The Institute for Strategic Studies
(ISS) and 3) The Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI). The Central Intelligence Agency is known to
22

be active in Eastern Europe defense budget estimation, but a
request for data by the author was rejected.
The ACDA data set was produced under ACDA contract to the
RESEARCH PROJECT ON NATIONAL INCOME IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE
through L.W. International Financial Research, Inc., New York,
New York by Thad P. Alton. The latest ACDA publication,
"World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1965-1974" of
31 December 1975, does not contain the Alton estimates prior
to 1965. To go back to 1960, the author obtained Alton's
original paper, "Military Expenditures in Eastern Europe:
Some Alternative Estimates" published in the Joint Economic
Committee of Congress Compendium, REORIENTATION AND COMMERCIAL
RELATIONS OF THE ECONOMIES OF EASTERN EUROPE, July 1974. These
estimates cover the period 1960-1974 and were produced using a
modified Direct Costing technique. This modification revolves
around the Personnel Pay and Maintenance (PPM) category where
the salaries of WTO Armed Forces personnel are costed in U.S.
dollars vice local currency. Alton is not clear as to why
dollar-costing is preferable to the domestic-costing used in
PPM by the CIA (for USSR estimates). He does make one adjust-
ment however, determining that while U.S. and WTO officers
should be costed equally, WTO enlisted personnel receive only
75% of their U.S. counterparts pay (because of lower techno-
logical qualifications). The remaining budget categories are
costed in domestic currency, totaled, and then converted to
dollars. Alton does not defend his methodology, other than
23

suggesting it provides a suitable alternative to the SIPRI
and ISS methods which rely on published official data.
The SIPRI and ISS data sets are estimated using the SRI
method. The official state budget appropriations are adjusted
upwards with outlays from other budget categories thought to
contain Ministry of Defense items. The SIPRI estimates are
published in the "World Armaments and Disarmament Year Book"
,
1975 [6] while ISS estimates appear annually in "The Military
Balance" [7]. Both estimates are similar because of the common
estimation method, but SIPRI is the most complete source
extending back to 1953 for some countries. A complete spend-
ing history of the seven WTO countries is available from 1960-
1974 for SIPRI and 1965-1977 • for ISS. However, obvious incon-
sistencies are present in the ISS data for all WTO countries.
This result is due to a failure to correct previous estimates
when new information becomes available in later years. At
most, the previous two years are adjusted and this causes
obvious gaps in the data which cannot be explained. Table II
shows some examples of the inconsistencies that result when the
complete data base is not updated as new information is made
available. In the case of Bulgaria, ISS estimates are missing
for 1971-1972. Czechoslovakia shows a major increase in defense
spending (92%) from 1966-1967 and a major drop from 1971-1972
(47%) which is not supported by either the SIPRI or ACDA data
in the same years. The GDR and Hungary have no similar dis-









ISS SIPRI ISS SIPRI
•1970 279 279 1965 715 1191
1971 305 1966 754 1275









ISS SIPRI ISS SIPRI
1971 2124 2124 1971 /543 570
1972 2240/1854 2242 1972 558/419 543
1973 2031/2032/2218 2457 1973 695/424/442 567
1974 2171/2373 2625 1974 457/447/477 611
Poland Rumania
ISS SIPRI ISS SIPRI
1970 2220 2244 1971 798 787
1971 /2350 2367 1972 725/453 818
1972 /1770 2481 1973 528/577 840
1973 1779/1890/1718 2463 1974 572/626 910
1974 2073/1832 2839
rThe first ISS value in a series indicates the original estimate;
the revised estimate follows, separated by /.
25

years, and the failure to apply the corrective action to all
the estimates. For example, in the case of the GDR, 1971
spending was $2124 mil and 1972 initially estimated at $2240
mil, but this is revised to $1834 mil in 1973. So what con-
clusion can be reached, was there a current spending increase
(and the revision of 1973 not applicable to 1971) or a current
spending decrease? Similar problems of inconsistency in
Poland and Rumania also occur.
This problem with the ISS data should not cause great
difficulties because the SIPRI data is an analogous data
source that is free of the obvious inconsistencies. Hence,
we can reject the ISS data for general use as a data base,
and use SIPRI without any serious loss.
Thus, the analysis will be supported by two distinct data
sources (i.e., for military expenditures), ACDA and SIPRI.
That each can be criticized in areas previously discussed only
points toward the need for more research in the Eastern
European area. However, in spite of the imperfections in the
data, both sources can be useful in uncovering those factors
most strongly affecting the decision process in WTO defense
budget formulation. This can be done by utilizing a method of
parallel analyses, where one data source is used to corroborate
the results of the other. Hence, the spurious conclusions
arising from the peculiarities of individual sources can be sup-





The analysis of cross-sectional variables provides a means
of making snap-shot comparisons between selected time periods
across the seven WTO countries using a given set of environ-
mental conditions. The selection of two specific years
enables a comparison over time which can be helpful in identi-
fying a trend in the effect produced by the underlying
influences. The two years selected are 1966 and 1974. 1966
is used as a representative sample of the early years (prior
to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968) while 1974 represents
the most recent years (post Czech 1968). Both years were
relatively uneventful hence free of any unusual or isolated
influences
.
The initial effort of the cross-sectional analysis is to
prepare a variable set hypothesized to explain the spending
patterns observed in the aggregate of WTO countries . Then
correlation and regression analysis can be applied to rank the
explanatory variables in order of importance and provide
predictive models for the "typical" WTO country.
1. Variable Set
The basic motivation in defense spending is security
of the homeland. The variables listed below suggest various
principles given consideration when the strength and capability
27

requirements of a defense force are determined by defense
policy-makers
.
a. Gross National Product (GNP)
The economic wealth of a country will likely
influence the size of the defense budget. Countries with
strong economies and sizeable GNP's tend to invest not only
in defense capability, but also in offensive capability as a
deterrence to unfriendly neighbors or to satisfy aggressive
designs.
b. Population (POP)
.Countries with larger populations require greater
defense allocations to provide minimum security for greater
numbers of persons and property.
c. Border Length (AREA)
Countries with long borders need larger defense
forces to repel invaders. Border length will be represented
by a similar variable, area, assumed to be highly correlated
and hence a suitable substitute.
d. Number of Military Personnel (NMILT)
The larger the size of the Armed Forces the larger
the defense budget. This variable is essentially a pseudo-
variable and its use can be questioned as its value undoubtedly
is a direct result of the defense budget. However, the inten-
tion is to see what role personnel costs play in the decision
process. If a salaried armed force generates substantial fixed
costs then NMILT should be prominent, indicating far less
28

flexibility for planners in other budget categories (i.e.,
personnel costs may act as a constraining mechanism on pro-
curement, new facilities, RDT S E, etc.). Such a situation
exists in NATO nations where the defense forces are filled
by volunteer or mixed conscript-volunteer recruiting systems
which command salaries comparable to the civilian work force.
Conversely, in the WTO nations where conscription is universal
and minimal wages are paid, the personnel costs would not
appear to exhibit the same constraining effect . The appear-
ance of NMILT in the WTO model would refute this last statement
and imply that personnel costs do indeed significantly
constrain WTO budgetory spending (i.e., in the SIPRI model
only , recall that ACDA MX applied U.S. salary scales to NMILT
so it may appear in the model without implying a significant
constraining influence)
.
B. WTO (1966, 1974)
The WTO data for 1966 and 1974 is listed in Appendix B.
Both ACDA and SIPRI military expenditure data will be used in
parallel analyses and the results compared.
Correlations and Regression analysis cannot reasonably be
applied to the raw data because of the lack of linearity and
difference in magnitude with the USSR and the other WTO coun-
tries. Thus, if we expect to use least squares regression, it
is necessary to first transform the data so that it is more
linear. A logarithmic transformation was applied to the data
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and the plots for 1966 in Appendix B-3 show a suitable linear
relationship between the variables
.
The correlation matrices for 1966 and 1974 are shown in
Table III. Very high correlations are present as a result of
the log transformation. Clearly with such a small sample
size (seven data points) the inference limitations of cor-
relation and regression analysis are significant. Wallenius
[8] discusses the sample size problem and suggests computing
the mean and variance of the coefficient of determination (r 2 )
as an indication of the amount of spurious correlation present
The calculation of u z and a z is based on a sample size N
from a (K+l) -dimensional multivariate normal distribution in
which the explanatory variables have no predictive relation
with the dependent variable. The result is
KE[r 2 ] = u.r 2 " N-l




Thus u 2 and o 2 indicate the mean and variance for the rr r
statistic based on sample size and the number of explanatory
variables. This allows a statistical test of the significance
of the r 2 statistic found in the regressions. Table IV shows
the results of regressions performed on the 1966 and 1974 data
Both Tables III and IV show GNP having the highest correla-
tion with region-wide WTO defense spending. Population or




WTO VARIABLE SET CORRELATIONS
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The difference in the regression equations between the ACDA
and SIPRI data shows the effect of direct costing for Personnel
Pay and Maintenance. The NMILT variable is significant in the
ACDA model but not in the SIPRI model, thus fixed personnel
costs are not a significant constraining influence. The very
high r 2 values, significant at the .01 level (see low P* values
in Table IV) demonstrate the effectiveness of the log transfor-
mations in introducing linearity into the variable set
.
The significance of the result is that GNP more than any
other factor determines the size of the defense budget (how-
ever, area and population are not insignificant). Only minor
differences occur in the models over time so some confidence
in estimating military spending for the typical WTO country
in terms of ACDA or SIPRI methods is present.
C. RATIO VARIABLES
Section III-B concluded that GNP was the most significant
explanatory variable in the variable set. Further analysis is
possible using various ratios from the variable set, thus
enabling a characterization of individual countries over the
two years selected. The ratios selected are MX/GNP, GNP/POP
and NMILT/GNP, which can be categorized as follows:
MX/GNP - a measure of the economic burden of the defense
budget on the domestic economy.
GNP/POP - a measure of the general wealth of the country




NMILT/POP - a measure of the militarization of the country
with NMILT representing not only force size but also equipment
and facilities.
The ratio variables for 1966 and 1974 are listed in Tables
V and VI. It should be noted that the sources producing MX
estimates by direct costing, specifically the ACDA, caution
against the use of MX and GNP together. For example,
"It should be noted that estimates of Soviet
GNP are expressed in a kind of dollar equiva-
lent that is derived from complex valuation
of Soviet and U.S. GNP in both rubles and
dollars. These dollar equivalents differ
from those used to value Soviet Military
expenditures in terms of cost to duplicate
in the U.S. Thus, these GNP estimates are




"The GNP data for other Warsaw Pact countries ..
.
...reflect the same type of hybrid dollar
equivalent valuations as used for Soviet GNP.
For these countries also, dollar estimates
for military expenditures are not directly
comparable to the estimates of GNP in hybrid
dollars." [6]
SIPRI does not use different dollar equivalent measures in
estimating military expenditures and national income, so a
suitable ratio can be found using SIPRI estimated Net Material
Product (NMP) 1 .
x Net Material Product is the measure Eastern European coun-
tries use to represent National Income. Unlike GNP in the West,
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The results in Tables 5 and 6 are displayed graphically as
deviations from the WTO mean in the histograms in Figures 1 and
2. The most significant result is the change in MX/NMP from
1966 to 1974 by the GDR moving from fourth (below WTO mean) to
first. Of the remaining countries, Czechoslovakia, Poland and
USSR dropped in rank ( with Poland going from above to below
the WTO mean) while Bulgaria and Hungary remained unchanged.
The change in GNP/POP shows the GDR overtaking Hungary but still
well below the WTO mean. Bulgarian and Rumanian GNP/POP im-
proved but they still remain the poor-cousins in the WTO. The
NMILT/POP shows sizeable improvement in the GDR while Rumania
dropped considerably. Bulgaria remained the most militarized
country while the remaining countries all held similar positions
as in 1966.
The results of Tables 5 and 6 and Figures 1 and 2 show the
GDR rapidly increasing its share of the military burden which
together with the Czechs and Soviets are carrying an above
average load in defense spending. These three countries are the
economic leaders as well but the GDR has not yet reached the per
capita troop strength of the other two leaders. Hungary, Poland
and Rumania are consistently below the mean while Bulgaria
exceeds the mean only in per capita troop strength.
D. CONCLUSIONS
1. GNP is the most important factor in the defense budget
decision process. The predictive models for 1966 and 1974 are
37
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not significantly different. The number of military personnel
is present as a factor in ACDA models because of the direct
costing estimation technique but not in the SIPRI model Thus,
personnel costs, while not insignificant, do not play a major
role in the budget process.
2. Rankings in absolute spending have remained constant
except for the GDR which is now out-spending Czechoslovakia.
The same result is true in military expenditures per NMP where
the GDR has moved from fourth to first. MX/NMP above the mean -
CZ, GDR, USSR; NM/NMP below the mean - BUL, HUN, POL. Rumania
NMP is not available.
3. Rankings in absolute GNP ( constant $ 1970) remained
constant over the period with the per capita GNP leaders
Czechoslovakia, GDR and USSR. Bulgaria had the largest gain in
per capita GNP pulling close to Hungary and Poland while Rumania
still ranks well behind.
4. Rankings in force size shows absolute increases in the
GDR, Poland and the USSR while other countries decreased (BUL -
2.6%, CZ - 10%, HUN - 5.8%, RUM - 17.5%). Bulgaria, Czechoslo-
vakia and the USSR remain the per capita force leaders while both
the GDR and Poland improved, but still remain below the mean.




A. PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND
The purpose of the longitudinal analysis is to investigate
the conformity or deviance in defense spending policy of WTO
member countries vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. This is accomp-
lished by computing the degree of association over time between
member country military spending and that of the Soviet Union,
other WTO nations and various military and economic factors.
Such a methodology enables a systematic study of both region-
wide influences, and those characteristic of a specific country.
The analysis will focus on the period 1960-1974, a broader and
more recent time frame than that of other studies [Kintner and
Klaiber 1956-1968, Linden 1965-1969] and employs both parametric
and non-parametric methods of statistical inference in the
testing of hypotheses and the developments of forecasting models
Related studies have been published by Kintner and Klaiber
[9] and Linden [10]. Both works concentrated on region-wide
conformity and foreign policy deviance from the Soviet Union
by East European countries (i.e., WTO members plus Yugoslavia
and Albania) . Each author constructed an index of conformity
(or reverse deviance) which purported to represent an ordinary
measure of WTO conformity to Soviet-dictated policy in the
international sphere. Thus, with the conformity index, the
testing of various hypothesized relationships was possible using
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Spearman and Kendall correlation coefficients. A brief descrip-
tion of the index construction technique used by each author
is found in Appendices C and D.
The data base, spanning approximately 30 variables, is
listed in Appendix B, showing variable name definitions,
sources and the raw data. Where the data values were measured
in U.S. dollars, the GNP Implicit Price Deflator was used to
convert current dollars into constant 1970 dollars.
B. TESTING FOR REGION-WIDE INFLUENCES
To uncover the factors underlying the degree of deviance
from Soviet set defense policy, it is first necessary to con-
struct an index which will give some measure of conformity in
WTO defense spending over the 1960-1974 time frame. Such an
index can be constructed by computing the Pearson correlation
between the individual WTO MX variable and the USSR MX, and
then ranking each country from highest to lowest. Table VII
shows the Pearson correlations for each country using the two
MX data sources . The rank orderings can now be used as con-
formity indices for each data source (ACI-ACDA Conformity Index,
SCI-SIPRI Conformity Index) . Thus the index representing con-
formity to the USSR in defense spending policy is based on the
assumption that Soviet military expenditures are the model to
be emulated by the European WTO members , The adherence to the
trend set by Soviet MX over time is what is expected of the WTO







MX ACDA Rank SIPRI Rank ACI SCI Rank
Bulgaria .875 5 .618 6 POL GDR 1
Czechoslovakia .942 3 .799 4 GDR POL 2
GDR .982 2 .959 1 CZ RUM 3
Hungary .907 4 .766 5 HUN CZ 4
Poland .987 1 .955 2 BUL HUN 5
Rumania .599 6 .924 3 RUM BUL 6
The degree of association between the various ordinal
indices can be computed using Spearman and Kendall rank order
correlations. All Spearman correlation coefficients (r) and
Kendall correlation coefficients (t) are computed with a speci-
fied level of significance. The level of significance is used
to test the following hypothesis:
H : The correlation coefficient computed is not
significantly different from zero.
H-, : The correlation coefficient computed is signifi-
cantly different from zero (i.e., accept the computed r or x




To use the level of significance the analyst must first
make a decision as to how certain he is in accepting or reject-
ing H . If H is rejected when in fact it is true, a Type I
error has been committed. The probability of committing a Type
I error is given by a. That is,
PCType I error) = a.
.
The larger a is the more likely it is that H will be rejected
falsely. The decision made by the analyst is in the size of
a. If he wants to be 99% sure of his result an a = .01 is
selected, if he only wants to be 80% sure an a = .20 is selected.
The a value should always be set prior to collection of the data.
After the correlation coefficient has been computed the a value
is compared with the level of significance. If the level of
significance is less than or equal to a , H can be rejected.
For the purpose of this thesis a is set equal to .20 meaning
that there is a 20% chance that H was rejected falsely. The
o J J
a = .20 was selected because of the small sample size (N = 6)
and also because the data is made up of crude and imperfect
estimates. An a = .20 gives a general idea of the trend of the
data while still giving the obvious disassociations the power
to prevent acceptance of erroneous results.
All Spearman and Kendall correlations were computed using
the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) [11].
The initial test performed computed the correlation between the
ACDA Conformity Index (ACI) and the SIPRI Conformity Index (SCI)
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This is necessary because to proceed with a parallel analysis
the two indices must have some measure of agreement. The
hypothesis tested is
H : There is no relationship between the ACI and SCI
(i.e., the correlation coefficient is not significantly differ-
ent from zero)
.
H,: There is a relationship between the ACI and SCI.
a = .20
Results: Spearman correlation r = .600 at .104 level of
significance
.
.104 < .200 => reject H
—
J o
Kendall correlation x = .467 at .094 level of
significance
.094 < .200 => reject H
— o
The results imply that the ACI and SCI are in fact related
suggesting a reasonable preference to accept the contention that
each index represents a rank ordering of the same phenomenon.
However, both r and t appear to be low. A visual comparison of
the two indexes points to an obvious discrepancy in the case of
Rumania. ACI ranks Rumania sixth while SCI ranks Rumania third.
The blatantly dissident behavior of Rumania over the time period
and the rank of third assigned in the SCI causes some suspicions
to arise over the validity of the Rumanian SIPRI data. These
doubts will be investigated more fully in later sections. In
spite of this, the ACI and SCI can be used to test region-wide
influences on defense spending.
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1. Trade Dependence on the USSR
The first factor hypothesized to influence member
country defense spending is trade dependence on the USSR. The
Soviet Union remains an important supplier of certain essential
raw materials , energy resources and some advanced technology to
the Eastern bloc. There is no doubt that restriction of trade
by the USSR could be used as a means of inducing a recalcitrant
pact member into pursuing a defense policy more acceptable to
the USSR. An index incorporating East European trade dependence
on the USSR can provide a measure of the power available to the
USSR to insure alliance conformity. The Trade Conformity Index
(TCI) used is identical to that used by Kintner and Klaiber [9]
and Linden [10]. It ranks mean percentage of trade with the
USSR over the 1960-1974- time period. The result is shown in
Table VIII. It should be noted that the TCI remains unchanged
if mean percentage trade with the USSR plus WTO countries is
measured either over the full time period or are computed for
more recent years (i.e., last five years only).
The following hypothesis can now be tested using the
TCI, ACI and SCI. If the level of significance is less than or
equal to a = .20 we will reject H .
H : There is no relationship between trade dependence
on the USSR and conformity to USSR defense policy.
H, : There is a relationship between trade dependence




TRADE CONFORMITY INDEX (TCI)
BUL CZ GDR HUN POL RUM
% of trade USSR 52.5 34.2 41.4 34.1 32.8 31.7
Rank 13 2 4 5 6
Results rACDA = *0 8^ level of significance = .436




c, TpRT = -. 3143 level of significance = .272
.272 4 .200 => accept H
—
r o
T AfDA = '0667 level of significance = .425
.425 4 .200 => accept H
— * o
Toypn = -.200 level of significance = .287
.287 4 .200 => accept H
-
This result is contrary to that of Kintner and Klaiber
[9] who found trade dependence related to their Conformity Index
(t = .52 with a significance at the .068 level). It should be
noted that the authors included Yugoslavia in their index. This
introduces a bias as Yugoslavia is known to be more deviant than
other Eastern European countries . If the Kintner and Klaiber
results are replicated without Yugoslavia then x = .2 76
at .222 -significance. This result would require acceptance
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of H using an a = .20. Linden [10], testing the same hypo-
thesis with his Index of Deviance, also finds no significant
relationship between trade dependence and conformity to Soviet
Policy.
2 . Level of Economic Development
The question of socioeconomic levels in Eastern Europe
is an interesting one to consider. Would we find that the
higher the economic development of a country the more inter-
action it would have with the West and thus the less significant
would be the influence of the USSR; or would there be an
increased fear of economic disruption by the USSR if it strayed
too far from the Soviet line? This factor can be tested as it
relates to defense spending by measuring the degree of associa-
tion between the ACI (ACDA Conformity Index) or SCI (SIPRI
Conformity Index) and some index of economic development. A
meaningful yet simple, index of economic development can be
constructed by ranking the mean GNP per capita. Table IX
shows the EDI (Economic Development Index) based on the GNP
per capita tables in Appendix B.
TABLE IX
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INDEX (EDI)
BUL CZ GDR HUN POL RUM
Mean GNP/POP 1192.8 2112.6 2127.9 1413.3 1307.1 1107.2
Rank 5 2 13 4 6
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The following hypothesis can now be tested:
H : There is no relationship between economic develop-
ment and conformity to USSR set defense policy.
H, : . There is a relationship between economic develop-




-6571 level of significance = .078




c, TpR = .3714 level of significance = .234
. 234 i .20 => accept H
—
v o
T AfnA = -600 level of significance = .045




c, Tp_ = .333 level of significance = .174
.174 < .20 => reject H
—
J o
This result shows a significant relationship between
economic development and conformity for the ACDA index while
it is somewhat inconclusive for the SIPRI index. Kintner and
Klaiber [9] using a more complex socioeconomic index found they
could reject H with ax = .57 at a significance level of .031.
o °
Linden using the GNP per capita index versus the deviance index
also rejected H with an r = .857 at less than .01 significance.
These results are supportive of the ACDA index and tend to imply
subjectively that the SIPRI conformity index is a less accurate
measure
.
3 . Susceptibility to USSR Military Intervention
Military interference in the internal affairs of WTO
member countries is a real possibility as evidenced by the
49

intrusions into Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.
The vulnerability of each country depends on the size of any
Soviet military force stationed in the country or its geographic
position relative to the USSR. To construct the index we will
rank those countries with Soviet troops according to the size
of the troop contingent. Reference 2 ranks 1) GDR - 20 divi-
sions, 2) CZ - 5 divisions, 3) HUN - 4 divisions, and 4) POL -
2 divisions. This breakdown represents the disposition of
Soviet troops since 1968 and is based on status-of-forces agree-
ments with the GDR, POL, RUM, HUN signed in 1956-1957 and with
CZ in October 1968 [7]. (Notice that the agreement with RUM did
not remain in effect and Soviet troops left in 1958.) For those
countries without Soviet troops we rank RUM five as it borders
the USSR and BUL six as an intrusion into BUL would have to
cross either Rumania or Yugoslavia both of whom would likely
resist such an action. Thus, the resulting Military Intervention
Index (Mil) is as follows:
Mil
BUL CZ GDR HUN POL RUM
Rank 6 2 1 3 4 5
The following hypothesis can now be tested:
H : There is no relationship between vulnerability to
USSR military intervention and USSR defense policy.
H, : There is a relationship between vulnerability to




Result: rAfDA = '^00 level of significance = .104




= .5429 level of significance = .133






l+ 667 level of significance = .094
.094 < .20 => reject H
—
J o
T--- _ = .4667 level of significance = .094
.094 < .20 => reject H
—
J o
This result shows a significant relationship between a
country's defense spending policy and its susceptibility to
military action by the Soviet Union. Both Kintner and Klaiber
[9] and Linden [10] conclude that a similar null hypothesis can
be rejected.
Some readers might argue for a higher ranking in the
case of Poland because of strong historical and economic ties
to the USSR and the nearness of a substantial Soviet military
force (20 divisions in the GDR , common border with USSR, etc.).
If the MCI were to rank Poland second and slide CZ and HUN one
rank, the rank order correlations would improve to the .7 3-. 8 9
range, giving further support to the importance of military
vulnerability in WTO defense policy decisions.
4 . Conclusions
a) Trade dependence is not significantly related to
conformity to USSR defense policy.
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b) Economic development and conformity to USSR defense
policy are related but reasonable doubt exists in the case of
the SIPRI data.
c) Susceptibility to USSR military intervention and
conformity to USSR defense policy have a significant relation-
ship.
C. TESTING SPECIFIC INFLUENCES IN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES
The hypothesis testing completed above is useful in identi-
fying the region-wide factors influencing defense policy, but
it cannot be used to investigate each country for specific
peculiarities existing among the many economic and military
factors occuring over time. Given the complexities of the
domestic and international interactions that occur in the formu-
lation of a national defense budget, it would be a naive
proposition to suggest that one or two factors determine the
policy followed. Thus, to use one or two variables in a linear
forecasting model is not to imply that only these factors deter-
mine a country's spending decisions, but rather that the
explanatory variables result in the smallest variance possible
in a forecasting model. These variables carry the explanatory
effect of other important variables (whose estimators may not
be significantly different from zero when regressed together)
into the linear equation.
The aim of the analysis will be to identify those factors
most closely associated with the military spending of each
country over the 1966-1974 time period. We will consider the
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military expenditures of NATO (NATOT - Total NATO, NAEXC -
Total NATO less U.S., and NAEUR - Total NATO European) as well
as those for the USSR, and neighboring countries both in the
Eastern and Western alliances. In addition, certain economic
factors will be considered such as GNP , trade (TRATOT - Total
trade, TRAUSSR - Total trade with USSR, TRAEE - Total trade
with other WTO nations less USSR, and TRAWEST - Trade with the
West 2 ) and Balance of Payments (BPTOT, BPUSSR, BPEE and BPWEST)
.
Those variables moving with a country's military expenditures
over time should produce high correlations thus providing a
clue as to what factors might weigh most heavily on the policy
actions observed. Those factors with the highest correlations
can then be nominated as candidates for inclusion in the fore-
casting model which is constructed using a step-wise regression.
Due to similarities in many of the variables, multicollinear-
ity can become a problem. Therefore we will not nominate two
variables of the same class highly correlated with each other
(e.g. , NAVEUR and NAEXC) for inclusion in the step-wise regres-
sion. In addition, variables highly correlated with the subject
country's MX, but for which no substantive interactive relation-
ship is expected (e.g., between Poland and Portugal) will not be
considered.
2 The Western countries considered are Austria, BENELUX count-
ries, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, W. Germany, Greece, Italy,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and U.S.A.
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In each regression a group of statistics is generated to
help determine the suitability of the model. The following is
a brief description of each:
r
2
- the coefficient of determination is a measure of
how well the model fits the data. It gives the proportion of
total variance accounted for by the model.
t-statistics - the t-statistics, indicated in parenthesis
below the coefficient in each regression equation, allow a test
of significance on each coefficient estimate. As a general rule
if the t-statistic is greater than 1.8 (assuming N = 15, K = 1
or 2) the coefficient can be accepted as significant at the .05
level
.
SER - the Standard Error of Regression gives a measure
of the standard deviation about the regression line for the
model.
F-statistic - the F-statistic allows the entire model
to be tested statistically for significance. As a general rule
if the F-statistic is greater than 5 . (N = 15 , K = 1 or 2 ) the
model can be accepted as statistically significant.
DW-statistic - the Durbin-Watson statistic is used in
conjunction with the analysis of residuals. If structure is
detected in the residual a test for serial correlation can be
performed using the DW statistic (see Appendix G).
1 . Bulgaria
Bulgaria is the southern most country in the WTO alliance
bordering Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Rumania. Correlations
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for 3 2 variables with BULMX (including military expenditures
for Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia) were computed. These values
using both ACDA and SIPRI data are listed in Appendix E. When
examining the individual correlations a subjective approach
is used to categorize the correlations as high range (above
.900), mid-range (.800-. 899) and low range (.799 and below).
Thus, the variables can be assigned into three nominal classi-
fications which enables some inference about the importance of
individual variables to be made
.
a. ACDA
The Bulgarian ACDA rank order correlations are
categorized in Table X. The most obvious relationship is the
high correlation military spending has with Bulgarian trade
with the other WTO members (TRAEE = .981) and with the USSR
(TRAUSSR = .934). Another economic variable BULGNP ( . 945 ) is
prominent as well. This result tends to support a contradic-
tion to the hypothesis that trade dependence is not related to
defense spending (i.e., in the case of Bulgaria). Also of
interest is the high correlations with Turkish (TURMX = .978,
TURMX
t _ 1
= .96) and lagged Greek (GREMX
t _ 1
= .902) spending.
This result is not unexpected when one considers that Bulgaria,
with no USSR troops, would be WTO ' s first line of defense
against a NATO attack from the south (i.e., from Turkey or
Greece). Poland is the only Eastern bloc country in the high
range. This indicates the defense policy of other WTO nations










1. TRAEE .9 81 1. USSRMX
±
.899 1. YUGAMX^ . .79 3





.96 2. NAEURt .895 3. FGRMX .754
4. TRATOT
t










.940 5. YUGMXt .866 6. BPWEST -.575
7. TRAUSSR
t
.9 34 6. CZAMXt .863
8. POLAMX
t































When the mid-range variables are considered, it is
interesting that the NATO (less U.S.) variables stand clustered
with the USSRMX variables . The balance of the mid-range
variables represent WTO nations with Yugoslavia, Greece and
FGR military expenditures . Of least concern are Balance of
Payments, Trade with the West and Total NATO spending.









= .9726 (2.719) (2.106)
SER = 25.92
F = 213.033
DW = 1.246 Equation 1
Equation 1 shows Bulgarian ACDA MX explained by
Bulgarian trade with other Eastern European countries and current
Turkish defense spending. The r 2 of .9726 shows a very good fit





coefficients are greater than 1.8 hence
significant as is the large F statistic of 213.0 33. The SER
shows the standard deviation about the model to be $25.92
million. Analysis of the residuals shows a lack of structure
and serial correlation is not indicated by the DW of 1.246.
b. SIPRI
The Bulgarian SIPRI rank order correlation in
Appendix E are lower than those for the ACDA variables. This
occurs because of the sharp differences between the ACDA and
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SIPRI data. The plot in Figure 3-b shows a large increase-
decrease in the SIPRI data over the 1962-1966 time period.
It is highly unlikely that such an expansion-contraction could
occur over a three year period without accompanying perturba-
tions in one or more of the other variables . Attempting linear
regression with BULSMX, as the dependent variable would not
produce a very satisfactory predictive model, but the data may
still be useful if the effect of the 1962-1964 disturbance can
be minimized or smoothed out. To accomplish this, a running
median of three, repeated until convergence smoothing program
is used [2]. Figure 3-c shows the results of the smoothing
process. The results of smoothing can also be seen in the
model improvement that results from the regression. Equation









= .7298 Equation 2
BULSMX = 7.307 + .023 FGRMX + .20 3 YUGMX
r
2
= .8566 (3.7585) (2.502)
SER = 14.1274
F = 35.8470
DW = 1.241 Equation 3
Equation 3 shows smoothed Bulgarian SIPRI spending







































= .8566 shows the increase from .7298 that occurred by
smoothing. Thus, with all coefficients significant over 85%
of the total variance can be explained with this model.
In examining the individual correlations some
improvement is noted, but it is necessary to redefine the high
range to include correlations greater than .800. The mid-range
is redefined as .700-. 799 while the low range is below .700.
Classifying the variable correlations in this manner results
in the categories of Table XI.
Some similarities now appear in the correlations
between the ACDA and SIPRI correlations. If the top third of
each data source is checked (i.e., the first eleven rank order
correlations) seven of eleven variables occur in both data
sources (TRAEE, TURMX^ , TURMX^ , , BULGNP^ , TRAUSSR, GREMX_ ,
,t t-1 t t-1
NAEXC.) . Turkish military spending and Eastern European trade
(TRAEE) rank in the high range for both data sources. The
SIPRI data indicates much lower rank correlations with USSR
and other WTO nations than found in the ACDA data. The low
ranking given to Rumanian spending, NATO total spending, trade
with the West, and Balance of Payments all show similarities
with the ACDA.
c. Conclusions
(1) ACDA correlations (with BULAMX ) are higher
than SIPRI (with BULSMX ) but show similar high range correla-
tions for trade with Eastern Europe and the USSR, NATO (less
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7. GDRSMX .74 6 7. RUMSMX . .642
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2. BPWEST^ -.224 12. TRATOT




(2) Spending policies of the USSR and other WTO
nations give low to mid-range correlations suggesting some
measure of defense policy independence from the USSR.
(3) Balance of Payments and Total NATO Military
Spending are not related to Bulgarian Military Spending.
2 . Rumania
Rumania is in the Southern Group of the WTO countries
bounded by Bulgaria in the south, Yugoslavia and Hungary to
the west, and the Soviet Union to the north and Black Sea to
the east. Soviet troops were invited to leave Rumania in June
1958 and have been denied transit rights in WTO military exer-
cises ever since [2]. Only recently has Rumania re-entered
the WTO fold by participating in joint exercises but there is
still reluctance concerning other WTO troops on Rumanian soil
[2].
The plots of ACDA and SIPRI military expenditures are
shown in Figures 4-a and 4--b. Once more sharp differences
between sources are present; however, it is the ACDA data which
exhibits the greatest variability over the time period. Per-
forming the median of three and split smoothing routine on the
ACDA data results in the plot shown in Figure 4-b. Comparison
of the smoothed ACDA and SIPRI plots shows a contradictory pat-
tern over the 1965-1970 time period.
a . ACDA
Correlations for the 31 variables correlated with































RUMANIAN ACDA MX (RUMAMX^)
RANK ORDER CORRELATION^





.852 1. NAEXC .72 9
2. TRAEE
t
.9 01 2. TRAUSSR
t
.848 2. FGRMX .78 5



















1. BPEE .2 37
7. TRAWEST
t



























The spasmodic movement in Rumanian real spending
is not strongly related with any of the 31 variables. The
economic variables Trade and GNP produce the closest relation-
ship along with Bulgarian spending. Except for POLAMX in the
mid-range, the remaining WTO countries and NATO have low to no
correlation with Rumanian spending.








= .9084 (5.555) (-3.576)
SER = 31.45
F = 59.5373
DW = 1.288 Equation 4
Equation 4 shows Rumanian ACDA MX explained by trade
with Eastern Europe and trade with the West. The negative coef-
ficient for TRAWEST is significant because it states that
Rumania spends less as trade with the West increases. Over 90%




Correlations for the 31 variables in Appendix E are
classified in Table XIII. Comparing Table XII with Table XIII
it is immediately obvious that except for Polish MX, a unique
inversion of the correlates occurs between ACDA and SIPRI data
sources. When the correlations in the two tables are rank
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11. NAEXC^ .808 11. BULSMX^ .438
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Spearman methods, no correlation between the two sources is
found (r = .00 at .5 significance, x s .0048 at .4-9 signifi-
cance). This result causes rejection of the hypothesis that
the two sources are observations of the s.ame phenomenon. Thus,
we are faced with two diametrically opposed variable sets each
in contradiction of the other.




= -35.7524 + .225 P0LSMX
t
+ 2.724 NATOT ,
r
z
= .9797 (9.871) (3.822)
SER = 16.7525
F = 289.4958
DW = 1.585 Equation 5
c. ACDA versus SIPRI
To resolve the contradiction over Rumania between
sources, it is necessary to reject one data base in favor of
the other. Thus, it is imperative to review the Rumanian
relationship with the USSR over the full breadth of the time
series .
Some excellent accounts of Rumanian social, eco-
nomic and political development can be found in Monitas , Pounds,
Fischer-Galiti and Floyd [12,13,14,15 and 16]. A fundamental
review of post-World War II events in Appendix F points to
economics as the key to deviance in Rumania. The second-class
citizenship of Bulgaria and Rumania as the producer of food-
stuffs and raw materials for the other WTO countries was rejected
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by the strongly nationalistic Rumanian leadership as far back
as 1949. The Rumanians sought to industrialize as a means of
achieving economic independence. This was only possible with
increased trade with the West which had the modern technology
and industrial equipment. The conflict with the Kremlin that
occurred in 1962-1963 over supra-national planning and control
of all WTO economies by COMECON resulted in a victory for the
Rumanian-led opposition. This followed with a call for nation-
al sovereignty and independence and the abolition of military
alliances. Since Rumania was not threatening withdrawal from
the Warsaw Pact, but only dissolution of all military alliances
and was not deviating on ideological grounds domestically,
the Soviets found it difficult to justify direct intervention.
Such action shows a country striving for rapid
industrial development using scarce Western currency to pur-
chase the most advanced technology. It is unlikely that the
steady increase in military expenditures shown by SIPRI would
occur if the national policy was conversion from an agrarian
to an industrial economy. Recall that SIPRI generally reports
the military expenditures as they are officially published
while the ACDA data, as estimated by Alton, represents the
estimated cost of procurement, operations and maintenance, man-
power and R S D. Data available from the ISS on Rumania for
the 1964-1974 time period indicates Rumanian troop strength
dropped from 222,000 to 171,000 (Appendix B). The fluctuations
in troop strength show a pattern similar to the ACDA military
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expenditure data. Certainly the reduction in force size does
not support the real spending increases shown in the SIPRI data.
Hence, a real cause for rejecting the ACDA data cannot be found,
in fact the independent assessment of the ISS troop data sup-
ports the ACDA data, and casts grave doubts on the SIPRI data.
Thus, given the economic aspirations of Rumania, the evidence
that sizeable reductions in the defense force occurred in sup-
port of this industrialization, and the anti-militarism/peaceful
co-existence philosophy espoused in support of national sovere-
ignty, a contradiction to real growth in defense spending as
indicated by the SIPRI data is present. Hence, we reject the
Rumanian SIPRI data in favor of ACDA and drop it from considera-
tion in subsequent analyses,
d. Conclusions
(1) Rumanian SIPRI data is rejected as unreliable
and permanently removed from this and subsequent analyses.
(2) Rumanian military spending is erratic with the
highest correlations occurring with Bulgaria and trade with
Eastern Europe.
(3) Except for Poland, mid-range correlations do not
involve other WTO countries , but contain the remaining trade
variables, GNP and Yugoslavian MX.
(M-) Rumanian military spending has the lowest correla-
tion with the NATO variables, USSRMX, GDRMX , HUNMX , CZMX, FGRMX




(5) The forecasting model shows a negative co-
efficient in trade with the West and a positive coefficient
with Eastern European trade. Almost 91% of the variance in
spending is accounted for in the model (SIPRI model, Equation
5 is rejected) .
3 . Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia is surrounded by WTO nations with the
exception of Austria to the south and FGR to the west. Mili-
tary data on the FGR will be included in the variable set, but
we will not consider Austria as it is not a NATO member and
has only a minimal defense budget, making it no threat to the
WTO. In addition, the USSR has five divisions comprising
70,000 troops permanently stationed in Czechoslovakia and main-
tains WTO Central Group Headquarters near Prague [2].
a . ACDA
The Czech rank order correlations from Appendix E
classified in Table XIV show the NATO (less U.S.) variables
most strongly correlated with CZAMX (NAEUR , = .986, NAEXC ,
= .984, NAEUR
t
= .973, NAEXC = .969). Following in the high
range (greater than .900) are all the WTO members spending
variables except Rumania (HUNAMX , = .952, POLAMX ^ = .946,
GDRAMX = .944, USSRMX = .942, GDRAMX
t _ 1






. 917 , HUNAMX = . 911) . The two lowest
variables in the high range are TRAUSSR and FGRMX , at .909
and .908 respectively. The mid-range correlations (.800-. 899)




CZECHOSLOVAKIA ACDA MX (CZAMX )
RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS

































































































, FGRMX and YUGMX . The low
range correlations include the NATO total MX variable, Rumanian
MX and Balance of Payments.
The high correlations with the NATO variables
implies a Czechoslovakian response to NATO European spending
(represented by "order-of-battle" changes., manpower levels,
weapons systems, etc.) backed up by her WTO allies (except
Rumania). Trade (except TRAWEST ) and GNP variables, while
still significantly correlated with CZAMX , have less explana-
tory effect than the spending policies of Hungary, Poland, GDR,
USSR, Bulgaria and FGR.
Performing the regression results in Equation 6
but the DW statistic indicates negative serial correlation.
CZAMX
t






DW = 3.14 5 Equation 6
Solving for the coefficient of serial correlation
p using the Hildreth-Lu grid search and performing the generali-
zed differencing procedure yields the final model in Equation 7. 3





= .9904 (35.32) where p =-.589
SER =38.52 DW = 2.17 CZAMX^ = CZAMX -pCZAMX.^










Equation 7 is the final model explained by one
variable, lagged NATO European MX. Notice the difference in
the model after the generalized differencing procedure is
applied. To forecast a value for CZAMX it is necessary to
.'.
solve for NAEUR , as shown using p = -.589. The final result





CZAMX^ = CZAMX" + pCZAMX^ _
t t t-1
Also noteworthy is the slight improvement in r 2
from .9718 to .9904. All summary statistics are significant
and no structure is noted in the residuals,
b. SIPRI
The SIPRI rank order correlations in Appendix E
show a similar phenomenon to that of Bulgaria (except Rumanian
data omitted as a result of the analysis in Section IV )
The SIPRI correlations are much lower because of sharp increases-
decreases not evident in the ACDA data. Figure 5-a and 5-b
show the contrast between the two while Figure 5-c shows SIPRI
data after the smoothing routine is applied. The correlations
for the smoothed data are displayed in Table XV with high range
(.800 and above), mid-range (.600-. 799) and low range (below
.600).
Unlike the Bulgarian SIPRI data, fewer similarities
occur between the two data sources. The smoothing routine was
able to minimize the short term increase-decrease phenomenon,
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1972-1974 where SIPRI indicates a sharp spending drop and ACDA
a steady increase. Examining the top third of the correlations







, GDRSMX ) . This tends
to place economic factors second to spending decisions made by
the USSR, Poland and the GDR. A direct contradiction arises
in the case of NATOT (ACDA, low range; SIPRI, high range) while
both sources show relatively little correlation with Balance
of Payments.
The step-wise regression using smoothed SIPRI data
gives the model in Equation 8.






DW = 1.3144 Equation 8
This model has a rather low r 2 . This is due to the
fact that the sharp decrease in Czech SIPRI spending in 19 72-
1974 is not supported by the variable set and is thus a question-




(1) Czechoslovakia defense spending over both data
sources is adhering closely to spending policies in the USSR,
Poland and the GDR. These variables carry more explanatory
effect than do trade and GNP.
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(2) Balance of Payments has very low correlations
with Czech defense spending.
(3) The ACDA data provides the best forecasting
model explaining 99% of the variance while the smoothed SIPRI
data explains 8 7% of the variance in Czech military spending.
3 . German Democratic Republic
The GDR is bounded by the FGR to the west, Poland to
the east and Czechoslovakia to the south and is occupied by
some twenty USSR divisions [2]. There can be no doubt that the
presence of 300,000 Soviet ground troops on GDR soil, out of
a total WTO complement of 400,000, plays the dominant role when
defense spending decisions are made [2]. Thus, we might expect
the data to validate the obvious (i.e., the GDR military expen-
ditures are highly correlated with USSR military expenditures).
a . ACDA
Correlations for 31 variables are listed in Appendix
E and classified high, mid or low range in Table XVI. As
expected, the GDR military expenditures are strongly correlated
with those of the USSR followed by Poland, Hungary, NATO Europe
and Czechoslovakia. Bulgarian spending is in the mid-range
while Rumanian spending is clearly deviating in the low range.
It is also significant that trade with the USSR (TRAUSSR
t
) is in
the high range while the remaining trade variables (TRAEE.
,
TRATOT and TRAWEST ) are all in the mid-range. In addition,
notice the strong correlation with GNP , mid-range correlation
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When the step-wise regression is performed a
satisfactory forecasting model, Equation 9, results.
GDRAMX
t
= 598.257 + .018 USSRMX + 1.298 HUNAMX
r
2
= .9825 (7.639) (3.551)
SER = 93.7183
F = 337.3311
DW = 1.9 65 Equation 9
Equation 9 shows GDRAMX explained by Soviet and
Hungarian military spending. Over 98% of the total variance
is explained by the model while all statistics are significant
at the .05 level,
b. SIPRI
Correlations for the 31 variables listed in Appendix
E are classified in Table XVII.
If the top ten variables from each source are com-
pared we find that eight of ten common to both ACDA and SIPRI
(POLSMX^, POLSMX^ lS USSRMX^, USSRMX,. , , GNP , HUNSMX^ , TRAUSSR^,t t-1 t t-1 t t
NAEUR ) . In addition, higher correlations exist with USSR trade
(TRAUSSR) than with the other trade variables. The forecasting
model resulting from the step-wise regression is Equation 10.
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t
. 342 7. NAT0Tt _ 1 .825
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Equation 10 shows GDRSMX explained by current
Polish MX and lagged Czech MX. Over 96% of the total variance
is explained while all statistics are significant at the .05
level.
c. Conclusion
(1) GDR military expenditures are strongly related
to the defense spending of the Soviet Union, Poland and NATO
Europe and to the economic variables GNP and USSR trade.
(2) High and mid-range correlations exist with other
WTO countries with Bulgaria having the lowest values.
(3) NATO Total Spending and Balance of Payments
have low correlations with GDR defense spending.
(4) The ACDA forecasting model explains over 98% of
the variance while the SIPRI model explains over 96% of the
variance in GDR defense spending.
4 . Hungary
Hungary is bounded by Austria, Czechoslovakia, USSR,
Rumania and Yugoslavia and is the smallest in area of the WTO
countries. The USSR has four divisions permanently stationed
in Hungary with the headquarters for the WTO Southern Group at
Budapest [2].
The ACDA and SIPRI plots in Figures 6-a and 6-b both
show similarities in the Hungarian military spending. In each
case spending increases sharply over 1961-1963 and then decreases
to 19 6 7 where the upward movement resumes. The only observable

























ACDA real spending continued to increase while SIPRI decreased
to a constant level in 1972. These similarities in spending
suggest some real phenomenon and not a spurious effect so a
smoothing of the data was not performed,
a . ACDA
Correlations for the 31 variables listed in Appendix
E are classified high, mid or low range in Table XVIII.
It is clear the Hungarian military spending is more
closely associated with GDR, NATO European, Polish, Czech and
USSR spending decisions than with those of Bulgaria, Rumania
and NATO Total Spending. Of the four trade variables only
Trade with the USSR (TRAUSSR ) is in the high range, but notice
TRAWEST^. ranks ahead of TRAEE^, the first such occurrence in
t t
any WTO country. Total NATO Spending and Balance of Payments
again rank lowest, but BPWEST shows a mild negative correlation
not seen in other WTO countries.










= .9594 (6.622) (3.627)
SER = 35.3428
F = 141.7026
DW = 1.805 Equation 11
Equation 11 shows Hungarian spending explained by
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The r 2 of .9594 indicates a very close fit while all summary
statistics are significant,
b. SIPRI
Correlations for the 31 variables in Appendix E are
classified in Table XVIV.
If the top ten variables in both sources are com-





POLMX 19 USSRMX , 9 NAEXC , , NAEUR ) . The trade
variables are even less significant in the SIPRI than in the
ACDA data but still have smaller correlations than GNP.









DW = .95 8 Equation 12
Notice the rather low r 2 and serial correlation
indicated by a low DW statistic.
Applying the Hildreth-Lu grid search and generali-
zed differencing procedure the final model is obtained in
Equation 13.





SER = 38.36 where HUNSMX^ = HUNSMX^pHUNSMX^^






















































































The r 2 = .6509 makes this model of marginal use
with only 6 5% of the variance explained by the independent
variable. This indicates that the downturn in 19 7 2 shown in




(1) Hungarian defense spending is strongly related
to defense spending by the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, USSR
and NATO Europe.
(2) Bulgarian and Rumanian spending has noticeably
less correlation than other WTO countries with Hungarian spend-
ing.
(3) NATO Total Spending and Balance of Payments have
little relation to Hungarian spending.
(4) Trade with the USSR has higher correlation with
Hungarian spending than the other trade variables
.
(5) The ACDA forecasting model explains nearly 96%
of the total variance in Hungarian spending. The SIPRI model
is not very satisfactory, explaining only 65% of the total vari-
ance.
5 . Poland
Poland is the largest WTO country, surrounded by the
GDR, Czechoslovakia and the USSR. The USSR maintains two divi-
sions in Poland with the headquarters for the Northern Group at
Leignitz near the Czech and GDR borders [2]. The ACDA and SIPRI
























until 19 71 where ACDA continues the upward trend while SIPRI
levels off.
a . ACDA
Correlations for the 31 variables from Appendix E
are classifed in Table XX. Inspection of the high range cor-
relations shows strong association with USSR defense spending
and trade, followed by GNP and GDR spending which itself is
most highly correlated with USSRMX . The remaining WTO count-
ries defense spending follows with Bulgaria last in the high
range and Rumanian MX quite distant in the low range. NATO
European spending and Eastern European trade are also prominent.
This is perhaps the classic example of a WTO country closely
adhering to the Soviet line.
The step-wise regression produces the forecasting




= 1255.7893 + .0124 USSRMX + .2391 POLTRAUSSR
r
2
= .9839 (3.1207) (1.9272)
SER = 69.22
F = 367.016
DW = 1.672 Equation 14
Equation 14 shows Polish MX explained by lagged
Soviet spending and current Polish trade with the USSR. All
summary statistics are significant and the r 2 = .98 39 indicates
a very satisfactory model.
b. SIPRI
Correlations for the 31 variables in Appendix E are
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When the top ten correlations from both sources
are considered, seven of ten (GDRSMX , USSRMX , GDRSMX ,
NAEUR , GNP, TRAUSSR) are common variables. In both data sets
trade with the USSR is the most important trade variable.
Rumania is once more deviating with a low range ACDA correla-
tion.




= 982.7562 + .4337 GDRSMX + .7111 HUNSMX ,
r
2
= .9518 (6.5553) (2.11404)
SER = 84.77
F = 118.616
DW = 1.549 Equation 15
Equation 15 shows Polish MX explained by current
East German and lagged Hungarian spending. Over 95% of the




(1) Polish defense spending is highly correlated
with spending in the GDR, USSR and NATO Europe. Also closely
related are Polish trade with the USSR and GNP.
(2) Correlations with Bulgarian spending rank lowest
for WTO countries except for Rumanian spending which has the
lowest ranking of any country, east or west,
(3) NATO Total Spending and Balance of Payments are
not significantly correlated with Polish spending.
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(4) The ACDA forecasting model explains 98% of




The anlaysis of WTO spending, both region-wide and by res-
pective members shows significant Soviet influence absent in
both Bulgaria and Rumania. The remaining countries (Czechos-
lovakia, GDR, Hungary and Poland) cluster in close agreement
with the Soviet Union for most correlations analyzed.
The methodology employed used both ACDA and SIPRI sources
so the myriad of military and economic factors could be tested
simultaneously in parallel analyses. Such a procedure prevents
the peculiarities of the individual sources (ACDA or SIPRI)
from forcing a spurious variable into candidacy as a causative
factor. Thus, by using the data sources to corroborate each
other, more credibility and confidence can be given to the
result
.
The initial effort of the study tested several hypotheses
using non-parametric methods of rank order correlation. The
six Eastern European WTO members were aggragated and tested for
1) Trade dependence on the Soviet Union versus conformity in
defense policy, 2) Level of economic development versus conform-
ity in defense policy and 3) Susceptibility to USSR military
intervention versus conformity in defense policy.
Contrary to the results of Kintner and Klaiber, and in
consonance with those of Linden, the author concluded that
trade dependence and conformity to Soviet defense policy are
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not related. It must be restated that this applies on a
region-wide basis and may not be true for individual countries.
Certainly in the case of WTO countries in recent years , where
increased trade with the West has meant a drop in the percen-
tage trade with the Soviets, no across the board assertion of
political or military independence has surfaced. Conversely,
Bulgaria, who remains most dependent on Soviet trade is ranked
fifth or sixth (next to Rumania) in the two conformity indices
constructed.
Both levels of economic development and susceptibility to
Soviet military intervention are related to conformity in
defense spending. Ease of military intervention shows the
strongest correlation with conformity in defense spending.
Both results support the conclusions of Linden [10] and Kintner
and Klaiber [9]. In the former case, the backward agricultural
economies of Bulgaria and Rumania were destined in the Soviet
Economic Plan to specialize as suppliers of raw materials and
food stuffs for the industrial countries to the north. Rumania
rejected this as a guise for exploitation and embarked on a
plan for rapid industrial growth. Bulgaria likewise experienced
rapid growth in GNP. In the latter case (i.e., ease of military
intervention by the Soviets), it is indeed significant that the
two most deviant countries in military spending (Bulgaria and
Rumania) are the only WTO nations without permanent Soviet troop
garrisons. This lends some support to the suggestion that fear
of Soviet military intervention, as occurred in Hungary and
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Czechoslovakia is a major incentive to staying in line with
Kremlin policy (at least in MX)
.
Certainly one cannot place Bulgaria in the dissident cate-
gory with Rumania based on the analysis so far. However,
Bulgaria presents an interesting case which is worthy of
further discussion. Table XXII is a summary of the forecasting
models and the top ten correlates common to both data sources.
Notice that Bulgaria is the only WTO country which has no other
member country's MX among the top third correlates. The
emphasis is on trade, GNP and Turkish, Greek and NATO (excluding
U.S.) military spending. The USSR, GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary, Poland cluster is in the mid-third of the ranked
correlations while Rumania is in the bottom third. This result
seems significant because the top third correlates for the GDR,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland all contain clusters made up
of some or all of the others (CZ with POL, GDR, HUN, USSR; GDR
with POL, CZ, HUN, USSR ( CZ straddles top-third/mid-third) ; HUN
with GDR, POL (USSR, CZ straddle top-third/mid-third), and POL
with GDR, USSR (HUN straddles top-third/mid-third)). Hence, a
cluster relationship between Czechoslovakia, GDR, Poland, USSR
and Hungary shows Bulgaria noticeably absent. Poland is the
example where the complete cluster is not present as Czechoslo-
vakia is missing. The observations can now be made that the
"cluster-of-four" (CZ, GDR, HUN, POL) tends to move together
with the USSR, even in the case of the Rumanian SIPRI data,
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GNP is a significant top-ten correlate in four of the six
countries CBUL, GDR, POL, RUM) while NATO (NAEXC. or NAEUR )
variables are present in three of the six countries (BUL, GDR,
POL). So while the GDR and POL seem in step with the USSR
there is also close attention paid to domestic economic changes
as well as Western Europe military spending.
Thus, we conclude that Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary and
Poland are all significantly acting according to the desires
of the USSR in regards to defense policy. Bulgaria, while
independent to some degree, cannot be placed in the same class
with Rumania regarding Soviet defense policy. This is clearly
shown in the correlation with USSRMX computed for data sources
for both countries. Bulgaria had correlation coefficients of
PACDA
= '87^ anc* Pptddt = -618 while Rumania had P A pr)A = -599.
This puts Bulgaria just outside the "cluster-of-four" but not
in any close association with Rumania.
The Rumanian case shows top-third correlates with Bulgarian,
Polish and Yugoslavian MX. Also prominent are the four trade
variables and GNP. It should be noted that these correlates
have much lower values than seen in the other countries. Thus,
Polish MX, with a correlation coefficient of .825, does not pro-
duce the strong association of Bulgarian MX or Trade with
Eastern Europe. The notable observation in the case of Rumania
is the fluctuations in military expenditures. That TRAEE
,
,
TRAUSSR and TRATOT are among the top-five correlates indicates
the underlying influence of these economic factors.
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Appendix F discusses the stress placed on Rumanian economic
development and the need to openly trade with the West for high
technology and equipment. This of course caused a reduction in
trade with WTO nations. Such total-share decreases are reflected
in the close association with RUMAMX of the TRAEE and TRAUSSR
variables. Also interesting is the forecasting model for
Rumania in Table XXII. Notice the model shows some trade off
between TRAEE and TRAWEST , indicating that more trade with the
West goes together with lower military spending.
The basic relationship might be expressed as shown below.
The USSR is depicted as the defense policy most desired by the
Kremlin. Conformity is measured from left to right shows Poland
and the GDR leading the cluster which also includes Czechoslo-
vakia and Hungary. Bulgaria does not hold a dissident position
but occupies a stance distinctly to the right of the cluster






Finally, we conclude that Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary
and Poland are the loyal supporters of USSR defense policy
while Bulgaria seeks a moderately independent course and Rumania
a dissident one. The analysis has shown both economic and
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military factors underly the degree of conformity to the dic-
tates of the Kremlin. In the case of economic factors,
Bulgaria and Rumania have the lowest GNP-per-capita and the
largest rate of growth over the time period studied. The other
four countries, while more industrialized, had lower GNP growth
rates over the same time period. The strongest influence
observed is fear of military intervention. The countries having
permanent garrisons of Soviet troops cluster together in the
correlation analysis while those without Soviet troops are in
noticeable disunion with the Pact leader.
Lastly, some measure of agreement was found (except in the
case of Rumania) between the ACDA and SIPRI data sources. This
was not an expected result given the hesitancy of the author in
accepting official data published by the WTO nations. There is
no doubt that further study is needed in the area of direct
costing estimation and currency conversion methods. Such
improvements in the data base will hopefully lead to increased




LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS -
ACDA - Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACI - ACDA Conformity Index
AMX - ACDA Military Expenditures
BE - Budget Estimate
BP - Balance of Payments
BUL - Bulgaria
CER - Cost Estimating Relationship
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency
COMECON - Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CMEA - Council for Mutual Economic Aid
CZ - Czechoslovakia
EDI - Economic Development Index
EE - Eastern Europe
EUR - Western Europe
EXC - Excludes U.S.
FGR - Federal German Republic (West Germany)
GDR . - German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
GNP - Gross National Product
GRE - Greece
HUN - Hungary
ISS - Institute for Strategic Studies
MC - Military Construction
Mil - Military Intervention Index
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MX - Military Expenditures
NA - NATO Military Expenditures
NMP - Net Material Product
NMILT - Number of Military Peronnel
NSE - National Security Expenditures




PPM - Personnel Pay and Maintenance
RDT 8 E - Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation
RUM - Rumania
RWP - Rumanian Workers Party
SCI - SIPRI Conformity Index
SIPRI - Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SMX - SIPRI MX
SRI - Stanford Research Institute




USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEST - Western Countries
WTO - Warsaw Treaty Organization
YUG - Yugoslavia
"Note: Abbreviations may be concatenated to further describe
a variable (e.g., BULSMX - Bulgarian SIPRI Military
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CROSS -SECTIONAL DATA 1966, 1974
1966
MX($:mil) GNP POP AREA NMILT
ACDA SIPRI ($mil) (mil) (sq mi) (thous
)
718 207 7530 8.26 42,829 156 BUL
1710 1275 23800 14.2 49,371 220 CZ
1360 94i+ 28200 17.1 40,646 122 GDR
672 301 11700 10.2 35,919 109 HUN
2070 1584 33400 31.5 120,359 260 POL
1120 546 16600 19.1 91,699 201 RUM
55300 47000 364000 234 8647,250 3165 USSR
1974
MX($:mil) GNP POP AREA NMILT
ACDA SIPRI ($mil) (mil) (sq mi) (thous
1560 416 19400 8.68 42,829 152 BUL
3070 2035 48100 14.7 49,371 200 CZ
3470 2625 59900 16.9 40,646 145 GDR
1360 611 23500 10.5 35,919 103 HUN
4300 2839 76200 33.7 120,359 303 POL
1980 910 43300 21.0 91,699 171 RUM







log GNP ($ mil)
(a) Log Data 13





log GNP ($ mil)
(b) Log Data 13
Log GNP vs log SIPRI MX
APPENDIX B-3























NOTE: Conversion to any constant base year is calculated as
follows : _ p. _.. _D.=Deflator for year
u
t) D, =Deflator for base year desired
Cbi d C,.=Constant index for base year b in year i
D




ACDA MILITARY EXPENDITURES [6]
($ mil current)
BUL CZ GDR HUN POL RUM
1959 500 1050 565 405 1330 930
1960 565 1192 586 424 1468 1015
1961 604 1247 593 447 1591 1055
1962 645 1375 1033 528 1655 1090
1963 632 1442 1158 665 1781 • 1127
1964 680 1615 1191 676 1895 1141
1965 695 1680 1300 696 1980 1120
1966 718 1710 1360 672 2070 1120
1967 744 1850 1500 673 2200 1070
1968 769 1940 1930 745 2460 1140
1969 829 2020 2120 829 2700 1320
1970 930 2050 2370 989 2910 1470
1971 1030 2340 2540 1060 3280 1480
1972 1150 2470 2750 1100 3630 1720
1973 1310 2740 3110 1180 3860 1830





C$ mil constant 1970)
BUL CZ GDR HUN POL RUM
1959 663 1393 749 537 1764 1300
1960 739 1560 767 555 1921 1328
1961 781 1612 766 578 2056 1363
1962 823 1755 1319 674 2113 1392
1963 796 1817 1459 838 2244 1420
1964 843 2001 1476 838 2348 1414
1965 845 2043 1581 846 2408
.
1362
1966 850 2023 1609 795 2449 1325
1967 854 2123 1721 772 2525 1228
1968 851 2148 2137 825 2724 1262
1969 875 2132 2237 870 2849 1393
1970 930 2050 2370 989 2910 1470
1971 984 2235 2426 1013 3133 1414
1972 1064 2285 2544 1018 3358 1591
1973 1153 2411 2736 1038 3396 1610




SIPRI MILITARY EXPENDITURES [17]
($ mil current)
BUL CZ GDR HUN POL RUM
1959 141 1035 396 144 898 365
1960 154 1033 295 179 937 360
1961 187 1119 295 194 1069 386
1962 222 1276 796 283 1154 416
1963 256 1274 826 374 1300 439
1964 224 1202 855 355 1374 461
1965 198 1191 914 332 1461 502
1966 207 1275 944 301 1584 546
1967 213 1457 1062 313 1661 610
19 6 8 228 1560 1711 440 1905 670
1969 260 1679 1858 567 2105 749
1970 279 1755 2006 570 2244 768
1971 305 1876 2124 570 2367 787
1972 337 2012 2242 543 2481 818
1973 364 1976 2457 567 2463 840





($ mil constant 1970)
BUL CZ GDR HUN POL RUM
1959 187 1373 525 191 1191 484
1960 202 1352 386 234 1226 471
1961 242 1446 381 251 1381 499
1962 283 1629 1016 361 1473 531
1963 323 1605 1041 471 1638 553
1964 278 1489 1059 440 1702 571
1965 241 1449 1112 404 1777 611
1966 245 1508 1117 356 1874 646
1967 244 1672 1219 359 1906 700
1968 252 1727 1894 487 2109 742
1969 274 1772 1961 598 2221 790
1970 279 1755 2006 570 2244 768
1971 291 1792 2029 545 2261 752
1972 312 1861 2074 502 2295 757
1973 320 1739 2162 499 2167 739





(Lee Estimates .5 ruble/$) [4]




















NQN--WTO MILITARY EXPENDITURES [17]
C$ mil constant 1970)
FGR TUR GRE YUG
1959 4047 381 197 540
1960 4375 401 209 514
1961 4612 434 202 571
1962 5854 450 206 564
1963 6580 463 211 568
1964 6306 501 219 588
1965 6232 532 237 569
1966 6041 517 257 544
1967 6283 521 331 540
1968 5578 551 387 612
1969 6117 541 438 618
1970 6188 579 474 629
1971 6625 677 501 619
1972 7086 703 534 695
1973 7363 738 533 • 634








BUL CZ GDR HUN POL RUM USSR
1964 150 235 106 104 272 222 3300
1965 152 235 112 109 277 198 3150
1966 156 220 122 109 260 2Q1 3165
1967 154 225 127 102 270 173 3220
1968 153 225 126 102 274 173 3280
1969 154 230 137 97 275 193 3300
1970 149 168 129 101 242 181 3308
1971 148 185 126 103 265 160 3375
1972 146 18 5 131 103 274 174 3375
1973 152 190 132 103 280 170 3425





($ bil constant 1970)
NATOT NAEXC NAEUR
1959 82.116 20.924 18.771
1960 81. 314 21.76 19.617
1961 84.545 22.537 20.335
1962 91.817 24.576 22.282
1963 91.699 25.419 23.285
1964 89.954 25.858 23.637
1965 89.523 25. 775 23.792
1966 101.973 25.93 2i. 895
1967 114.793 27.063 24.878
1968 116.407 26. 304 24.244
1969 112.547 26.273 24.331
1970 104.564 26.71 24.67
1971 99.821 28.045 25.995
1972 101.461 29. 373 27. 318
1973 98.286 29.691 27.639






TOT EE USSR WEST
1959 1046.5 275.1 545.8 151.2
1960 1204.1 325.5 639.6 158.2
1961 1328.6 374.5 692.4 165.6
1962 1557.3 390.0 830. 8 206.2
1963 1767.2 455.6 946.1 246. 6
1964 2042.1 436.4 1082.2 359.3
1965 2353.6 510.7 1202.2 448.4
1966 2783.3 525.5 1370.1 646.5
1967 3030.1 628.2 1555.0 585.1
1968 3397.4 668.8 1840.0 530.0
1969 3543.7 747.6 1953.4 477.4
1970 3834.8 814.4 2033. 3 614.3
1971 4302.0 918.5 2304.4 574.9
1972 5193.7 1174.3 2819.0 644.4
1973 6568.0 1467.7 3500.4 874.9





($ mil constant 1970)
TOT EE USSR WEST
1960 1575.5 837.0 425.9 207.0
1961 1717.0 895.0 484.0 214.0
1962 1988.0 1061.0 497.9 263.0
1963 2226.7 1192.0 574.1 310.7
1964 2530.0 1341.0 540.7 445.2
1965 2862.5 1462.0 621.1 545.4
1966 3292.9 1621.0 621.7 764.9
1967 4377.2 1784.0 720.9 671.4
1968 3761.6 2037.0 740.5 586.8
1969 3739.6 2061.0 788.9 503.8
1970 3834.8 2033.0 814.4 614.0
1971 4109.6 2201.0 877.4 549.2
1972 4804.7 2608.0 1086.0 596.1
1973 5779.1 3080.0 1291.4 769.8
























53. 35 25.04 13.24
53.54 25.78 13.95

















TOT EE USSR WEST
1960 1365 362 547 304.6
1961 1607 379 650 421.2
1962 1759 428 714 464.1
1963 1937 433 812 495.3
1964 2168 485.8 915 520
1965 2179 470 845 545
1966 2399 494 804 692
1967 2942 549 829 1092
1968 3077 621 882 1066
1969 3374 726 918 1157
1970 3811 843 1030 1304
1971 4204 926 1051 1458
1972 5234 1134 1284 1838
1973 7166 1552 1507 3206
1974 10018 1831 1578 4183












1961 2076.7 840.0 489.8 544.3
1962 2245.5 911.5 546.4 592.5
1963 2440.6 1023.1 545.6 623.7
1964 2686.0 1133.6 601.9 644.2
1965 2650.1 1027.7 571.6 662.8
1966 2838.3 951.2 584.5 818.7
1967 3376.1 951.3 630.0 1253.1
1968 3406.9 976.6 687.6 1180.
3
1969 3559.4 968.7 766.1 1221.0
1970 3 811.0 1030.0 843.0 1304.0
1971 4016.0 1004.0 884.6 1392.8
1972 4842.0 1187.8 1049.1 1700.4
1973 6305.3 1325.0 1365.6 2820.9




BULGARIAN TRADE PERCENTAGE (.%)
USSR EE WEST
1960 40.07 26.52 22.32
1961 40.45 23.58 26.21
1962 40.59 24. 33 26.38
1963 41.92 22. 35 25.57
1964 42.2 22.4 23.98
1965 38.78 21.57 25.01
I960 33.51 20.59 28.85
1967 28.18 18.66 37.11
1968 • 28.68 20.19 34.63
1969 27.26 21.53 34.29
1970 27.03 22.11 34.2
1971 25.01 22.04 34.69
1972 24.52 21.66 35.11
1973 21.03 21.66 44.74
1974 15.75 18.28 41.76






TOT EE USSR WEST
1960 3745 1085 1289 630
1961 4070 1242 1369 733
1962 4264 1347 1610 660
1963 4622 1383 1799 707
1964 5005 1514 1875 845
1965 5361 1640 1977.
7
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1966 5481 1643 1835 1034
1967 5545 1723 1943 1031
1968 6083 1960 2044 1165
1969 6618 2063 2230 1251
1970 7486 2368 2430 1595
1971 8190 2558 2682 1550
1972 9578 3114 3217 1946
1973 12173 4057 3752 2691




TOT USSR EE WEST
1960 4900 1686.5 1419.6 824.3
1961 5259.7 1769.2 1605 947.3
1962 5443.4 2055.3 1719.6 842.6
1963 5823.7 2266.7 1742.6 890.8
1964 6200.9 2323 1875.8 1046.9
1965 6520.1 2405.7 1994.6 1105.5
1966 6484.6 2171 1943.8 1223.3
1967 6363.1 2229.7 1977.2 1183.1
1968 6735.1 2263.1 2170.1 1289.9
1969 6983.8 2353.3 2177 1320.2
1970 7486 2430 2368 1595
1971 7823.7 2562 2443.6 1480.7
1972 8860.7 2976.1 2880.8 1800.3
1973 10710.9 3301.3 3569.7 2367.8




















33.58 32.51 20. 31























TOT EE USSR WEST
1960 4402 1084 1883 778
1961 4532 1210 1983 767
1962 4786 1233 2339 698
1963 5044 1292 2449 764
1964 5565 1412 2595 924
1965 5880 1546 2516 1068
1966 6420 1696 2661 1199
1967 6735 1821 2826 1206
1968 7184 • 2066 3060 • 1241
1969 8277 2261 3402 1541
1970 9428 2644 3687 1929
1971 10058 2912 3837 2089
1972 12088 3560 4554 2630
1973 15374 4703 5324 3359





($ mil constant 1970)
TOT USSR EE WEST
1960 5759.6 2463. 7 1418.3 1017.9
1961 5856.7 2562.6 1563.
7
991.2
1962 6109.8 2986 1574 891.1
1963 6355.4 3085.7 1627.9 962.6
1964 6894.7 3215 1749.4 1144.8
1965 7151.4 3060 1880.3 1298.9
1966 7595.5 3148.2 2006.5 1418.5
1967 7728.7 3243 2089.7 1383.9
1968 7954.2 3388 2287.5 1374
1969 8734.5 3590.1 2386 1626.2
1970 9428 3687 2644 1929
1971 9608.1 3665.4 2781.7 1995.6
1972 11182.7 4213 3293.4 2433
1973 13527.4 4684.5 4138.1 2955.5




GDR TRADE PERCENTAGE (% )
USSR EE WEST
42.78 24.63 17.67



































TOT EE USSR WEST
1960 1850 595 559 417
1961 2054 654 688 441
1962 2248 729 809 439
1963 2511 782 860 549
1964 2846 862 988 652
1965 3030 88 3 1079 692
1966 3159 831 1044 781
1967 3476 1024 1205 843
1968 3592 1064 1331 805
1969 4012 1135 1439 995
1970 4823 1336 1639 1323
1971 5490 1422 1893 1319
1972 6446 1864 2281 1579
1973 8445 2416 2843 2219





(.$ mil constant 1970)
TOT USSR EE WEST
1960 2420.6 731.4 778.5 545.6
1961 2654.4 889.1 845.2 569.9
1962 2869.8 1032.8 930.6 560.4
1963 3163.9 1083.6 985.3 691.7




1966 3737.4 1235.2 1101.5 924
1967 3988.9 1382.8 1175.1 967.4
1968 3977.1 1473.7 1178.1 891.3
1969 4233.8 1518.5 1197.
7
1050
1970 4823 1639 1336 1323
1971 5244.4 1808. 1358.4 1260
1972 5963.3 2110.2 1724.4 1460.7
1973 7430.7 2501.5 2125.
8
1952.5











































TOT EE USSR WEST
1960 2821 735.4 856 779
1961 3190 835 975 925
1962 3532 960 1147 946
1963 3749 1008 1205 967
1964 4169 1098 1364 1098
1965 4568 1234 1510 1126
1966 4766 1223 1533 1302
1967 5171 1316 1823 1376
1968 5711 1447 2053 1503
1969 6351 1632 2322 1597
1970 7155 1898 2612 1789
1971 7910 2073 2813 2095
1972 10257 2666 3407 2994
1973 14142 3562 3961 5205






($ mil constant 1970)
TOT USSR EE WEST
1960 3691 1120 961.7 1019.3
1961 4122.5 1260 1079.1 1195.4
1962 4508.9 1464.3 1225.5 1207.7
1963 4723.7 1593.9 1270.1 1218.4
1964 5165.4 1689.9 1360.4 1360.4
1965 5555.7 1836.5 1500. 8 1369.5
1966 5638.6 1813.7 1446.9 1540.4
1967 5933.9 2092 1510.2 1579
1968 6323.3 2273.1 1602.1 1664.1
1969 6702.1 2450.4 1722.2 1685.3
1970 7155 2612 1898 1789
1971 7556.2 2687.2 1980. 3 2001.3
1972 9488.9 3151.9 2466.3 2769. 8
1973 12443.4 3485.2 3134.2 4579.8








































GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT [21]
($ mil current)
BUL CZ GDR HUN POL ' RUM USSR
1960 4563 19345 21531 8406 22399 10890
1961 4849 20114 21683 8830 24190 11628
1962 5259 20384 22274 9199 23868 12031
1963 5500 20000 23000 9700 25300 12900 277000
1964 6100 21200 24000 10500 26900 14000 305000
1965 6750 22000 26500 10900 30700 14800 333000
1966 7530 23800 28200 11700 33400 16600 364000
1967 8230 25600 30400 12700 35700 18100 399000
1968 9200 27400 32900 13600 38700 19900 440000
1969 10400 29700 36500 14500 42000 22000 475000
1970 11600 32600 39800 15900 46200 24500 537000
1971 13100 35400 43100 17100 50800 28000 585000
1972 14600 37900 46600 18300 56400 31400 621000
1973 16700 41900 51800 20400 64500 36100 698000





($ mil constant 1970)
BUL CZ GDR HUN POL RUM
1960 5970 25311 28171 10999 29307 14249
1961 6266 25993 28021 11411 31261 15027
1962 6714 26022 28435 11743 30470 15359
1963 6930 25200 28980 12222 31878 16254
1964 7558 26265 29735 13009 33327 17345
1965 8210 26757 32230 13257 37338 18000
1966 8909 28158 33363 13842 39515 19639
1967 9444 29377 34885 14574 40967 20770
1968 10186 30337 36427 15058 42849 22033
1969 10975 31342 38518 15302 44322 23216
1970 11600 32600 39800 15900 46200 24500
1971 12514 33817 41172 16335 48528 26748
1972 13507 35062 43110 16930 52176 29048
1973 15449 36867 45578 17950 56753 31764






1960 759 1854 1750 1102 987 774
1961 789 1836 1751 1141 1046 808
1962 838 1877 1766 1163 1006 821
1963 858 1807 1778 1210 1042 865
1964 928 1876 1791 1288 1079 918
1965 1001 1898 1919 1301 1197 947
1966 1079 1983 1951 1357 1254 1028
1967 1137 2054 2040 1429 1292 1076
1968 1217 2122 2130 1462 1339 1118
1969 1300 2192 2253 1486 1377 1160
1970 1366 2280 2328 1544 1422 1207
1971 1465 2348 2408 1571 1480 1305
1972 1574 2418 2536 1628 1576 1403
1973 1792 2525 2681 1726 "" 1699 1527
1974 1789 2619 2837 1792 1810 1651
1192.8 2112.6 2127.9 1413.3 1307.1 1107.2






BUL CZ GDR HUN POL RUM USSR
1960 7.867 13.65 16.1 9.98 29.7 18.4 214
1961 7.943 13.78 16.0 10.0 29.9 18.6 218
1962 8.013 13.86 16.1 10.1 30. 3 18.7 221
1963 8.078 13.95 16.3 10.1 30.6 18.8 225
1964 8.144 14.0 16.6 10.1 30.9 18.9 228
1965 8.2 14.1 16.8 10.2 31.2 19.0 231
1966 8.26 14.2 17.1 10.2 31. 5 19.1 234
1967 8. 31 14.3 17.1 10.2 31.7 19.3 236
1968 8.37 14.3 17.1 10.3 32.0 19.7 238
1969 8.44 14. 3 17.1 10.3 32.2 20.0 241
1970 8.49 14. 3 17.1 10.3 32.5 20. 3 243
1971 8.54 14.4 17.1 10.4 32.8 20. 5 245
1972 8.58 14.5 17.0 10.4 33.1 20. 7 248
1973 8.62 14. 6 17.0 10.4 33.4 20.8 250




KINTNER AND KLAIBER INDEX OF CONFORMITY [9]
The authors constructed the index by scoring individual
East European countries on conformity to Soviet policy in
seven broad areas. Conformity is defined as "the adoption,
pursuit or articulation of policy positions by East European
countries in accordance with related Soviet policies or objec-
tives" [9]. The seven indicators are each weighted in
proportion to the relative importance of the indicator. The




1. Membership in the Soviet bloc 0-20
2. De Facto participation in COMECON 0-08
3. De Facto participation in WTO 0-08
4. Use of military force on EE state by USSR 0-15
5. Criticism by USSR of EE state 0-02
6. Criticism by EE state of USSR 0-02
7. EE conformity to Soviet policy regarding
relations between Communist states,
relations between Communist states and
the West, major developments within USSR 0*-3 ,
5
The authors examined each EE country over the 19 5 6-19 6 8
time frame computing a total score for each year. The yearly
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scores were aggregated and each country was ranked for conform-
ity on the relative magnitude of its total. The result is
displayed below with a high score meaning low conformity and










LINDEN INDEX OF DEVIANCE [10]
Linden constructed two separate indices, one for use in
testing interactive deviance and the second to test attitudinal
deviances. To construct the interactive index the author coded
all bilateral national-level interactions (1550 total events)
for each country and various interaction partners (USSR, EE,
West, Peoples Republic of China, Yugoslavia, Albania, non-
aligned nations, Arab States, U.S. and Federal Republic of
Germany). Each event was ranked in importance from 1-5 (i.e.,
1 - establish diplomatic relations to 5 - scientific or cultural
exchanges, etc.). The scores awarded were aggregated and
precentage interaction with each interaction partner was com-
puted. The author then uses the percent interaction scores to
calculate a WTO mean, from which Z scores are calculated as
standard deviation difference of each country from the WTO mean.
The Z scores are then rank ordered to produce the interactive
index shown below.

















*1 means most deviation **1 means most conformity
6 means least deviation 6 means least conformity
The attitudinal index was constructed using M-6 events or
occurrences which provided a stimulus thought to provoke an
official reaction indicating the WTO member country's atti-
tudinal or ideological position with respect to the USSR.
Each country's reaction to the event was ranked by three inde-
pendent coders who scored the reaction using the following
criteria:
Strongly positive; strongly supportive; praise +3
Positive; support +2
Mildly positive; tend to support +1
Neutral; ambiguous
Mildly negative; tend to criticize -1
Negative; criticize; discourage -2
Strongly negative; strongly oppose; condemn -3
A WTO mean score was computed for each event. From these
correlations with the WTO mean a result was provided which
could be ordered to represent deviance from the typical WTO






















BUL CZ GDR HUN POL RUM
BULMX
t
.863 .862 .853 .921 .808
CZMX
t
.863 .944 .911 .936 .53
GDRMX
t
. 862 .944 .947 .973 .622
HUNMX
t
. 853 .911 .947 .929 .70
POLMX .921 .936 .973 .929 . 70
RUMMX
t
. 808 .53 .622 .7 .7
BULMX 1 .917 . 896 . 896 .926 .731
CZMX
t_ ]
.808 .939 . 895 .914 .492
GDRMX
1
.87 .939 .956 .976 .641
HUNMX
1
.85 .952 .907 .926 .616
POLMX
1
.94 .946 .972 .934 .712
RUMMX
1
.816 .584 .54 .679 .611 __ _
FGRMX
t
.838 .865 .828 .906 . 811 .639
FGRMX
1
. 754 . 908 .811 . 885 . 789 .505
YUGMX .866 . 839 .889 .786 .864 .604
YUGMX
1
.793 . 739 .942 . 881 .902 .713
USSRMX
-1 . 899 .933 .977 .914 .989 .639
USSRMX
. 875 .942 .982 .907 .987 .599
NATOT .211 . 573 .585 .4 .477 .185
NAEXC .899 .969 .94 .94 .94 .642
NAEUR
t
.895 .973 .947 .945 .946 .639
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BUL CZ GDR HUN POL RUM
NATOT
t_ 1
. 362 .648 .742 .616 .647 .099
NAEXC
t_ 1
.852 .984 .939 .929 .923 .563
NAEUR
t_ 1
. 855 .986 .934 .929 .928 .562
GNP
t
.945 .887 .955 .916 .981 .712
TRATOT .956 .884 .892 . 87 . 897 .731
TRAUSSR .934 .909 .945 .905 .985 ' . 783
TRAEE
t
.981 .886 .899 .835 .934 .811
TRAWEST
t
.79 . 847 . 843 .852 . 792 .703
BPTOT -.481 -.407 -.034 .561
BPUSSR
t
.67 -.235 .38 .227 . 535 .415
BPEE
t
-.616 -. 314 -.077 .293 -.097 .238
BPWEST
t











BUL* BUL** CZ* CZ** GDR HUN POL RUM
BULMX .609 .574 .651 .66 .567 .438
CZMX .609 .574 .871 ..811 .836 .852
GDRMX .651 .746 .871 .922 .892 .966 .94
HUNMX
t
.66 .680 .811 .831 .892 .805 .834
POLMX
t
.567 .666 .836 .930 .966 .865 .977
RUMMX
t
.438- .552 .852 .94 .834 .977
BULMX., .421 .534 .638 .668 .609 .474
CZMX .755 .760 .937 .91 .879 .829
GDRMX , .639 .722 .752 .851 .845 .944 .896
HUNMX
t_ 1
.586 .667 .669 .788 .837 .883 .812
POLMX
t _ 1
.564 .678 .823 .928 .96 .833 .96
RUMMX
t_ 1
.498 .642 .838 .961 .837 .974
FGRMX
t .854 .884 .59 .567 .754 .675 .737 .628
FGRMX
t_ 1
.627 .685 .478 .589 .745 .645 .781 .687
YUGMX
t
.738 .826 .547 .571 .752 .604 .723 .611
YUGMX
t_ 1
.693 .783 .588 .631 .792 .693 .715 .65
USSRMX
t_ 1
.63 .732 .768 .864 .948 .763 .944 .905
USSRMX
t
.618 .748 .799 .887 .954 .766 .955 .924
NATOT
t
.116 .170 .713 .760 .644 .574 .704 .808
NAEXC
t
.75 .836 .726 .768 .883 .711 .882 .808
NAEUR
t
.74 .827 .729 .777 .892 .723 .893 .822
-Raw data/ --Smooth data
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BUL * BUL** CZ* CZ** GDR HUN POL RUM
NATOT .289 .344 .793 .885 .825 .839 .855 .903
NAEXC .656 .743 .659 .758 .892 .737 .905 .844
NAEUR , .648 .739 .663 .767 .895 .736 .912 .853
GNP .653 .774 .703 .785 .913 ..72 .887 .809
TRATOT .649 .720 .531 .605 .819 .569 .719 .659
TRAUSSR .653 .768 .586 .629 .892 .646 .886 .562
TRAEE .709 .810 .568 .635 .832 .52 .763 .657
TRAWEST .428 .539 .491 .580 .76 .55 .575 .647
BPTOT .008 -.333 .022 -.291
BPUSSR .384 .394 -.319 -.404 -.342 .076 .343 .394
BPEE -.406 .446 .008 .006 -.087 .077 .009 .285
BPWEST
t










RUMANIAN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
SINCE WORLD WAR II
Pre-Communist Rumania was an underdeveloped agrarian
country rich in natural resources. Just prior to World War II,
80% of the employed population was engaged in agriculture
amounting to one-half of the Gross National Product [13]. The
petroleum reserves of Rumania are the largest west of the USSR,
but prior to 1940 the bulk of the oil was exported as crude
with little refining into petroleum products. Thus, prior to World
War II Rumanian trade consisted almost entirely of exported
agricultural products and raw materials, while imports were
exclusively finished goods.
The entry of Rumania into the communist sphere occurred with
the Soviet occupation of October, 1944 [14]. The regime of
Petra Groza was installed by the Soviets in 1945 and a system-
atic reorientation toward the USSR and away from the West was
started [14]. A strict subservience to the USSR was maintained
and the exploitation of the country's national resources con-
tinued in the name of war reparations. The reconstruction of
war-torn Rumania was secondary; in fact, Moscow directed the
Rumanians to reject Marshall Plan aid from the West [15].
At the time of Stalin's death in 19 53, the Rumanian Commu-
nist Party had set forth on a plan to industrialize the
country. The five year Plans, beginning in 19 49, called for
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increased capital investment in heavy industry, and while major
progress was made,, the population suffered from lack of consumer
goods. Trade existed almost entirely within the Eastern bloc,
with approximately seventy percent with the USSR at prices and
conditions detrimental to Rumania [14]. Even though the Stalin-
ists of the Rumanian Communist Party blindly followed the Kremlin
directives, an underlying struggle was taking place in the party
between Rumanian nationalists and Moscovites.
In 19 5 2-1955 the Rumanian Workers Party under Gheorghe
Gheorghiu-De j began to espouse the so-called "New Course" which
called for attainment of economic goals by international co-
operation with all nations [14]. This ran contrary to the
Soviet COMECON plan which called for specialization among mem-
bers. This plan would relegate the production of raw materials
and agricultural products to Bulgaria and Rumania, while more
developed members specialized in manufacturing. But by 1955,
trade with non-communist countries had reached $60,000,000.00,
approximately 20% of total trade. Clearly, the Rumanian leader-
ship did not plan to remain a poor-cousin to the GDR, Czechoslo-
vakia, Poland and the USSR.
In 19 56 the Hungarian uprising and the near revolt in Poland
induced the Soviets to moderate its dominant stance with the
satellite nations. More favorable trade terms, extension of
credits and increased quantities of raw materials and industrial
equipment were used to keep the tide of revolt from spreading.
It was during the period of appeasement that the Soviets were
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approached about removal of their troops from Rumania. The
actual withdrawal of troops eventually occurred in July, 1958.
Floyd [15], attributes this remarkable achievement to Kremlin
confidence in the stability of the Gheorghiu-De j regime and
its loyalty to Moscow. The terms under which Soviet troops
departed are not known, but clearly the dissident ambitions of
Rumanian leaders had not yet surfaced.
By 195 8 Rumanian industrial output had increased 450% in
ten years [15]. The country was growing economically and look-
ing for increased technology and industrial equipment from the
West. The Soviet occupation was ended and Rumanian leaders
were firmly in control. In spite of this, Rumanian leadership
maintained a strong Stalinist stance utilizing the secret police
to purge dissident behavior. Soviet foreign policy was consis-
tently praised as evidenced by the support given to the 1956
intervention in Hungary.
The first signs of conflict with the Soviets began as
Rumanian leaders began to lay the economic plans for increased
industrialization in the 1960's. Floyd [15] maintains that the
Soviets began to resist a plan that would lead toward develop-
ment of an independent industrialized Rumania. The Soviets
wanted the interdependence of the pact countries to bind the
alliance together.
Virtually all of the studies concerning the Rumanian-USSR
split stress the economic independence asserted by the Rumanians
in the mid- to late-1950 f s as the seed of the dispute. The
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humiliation of Khruschev brought about by the Cuban missile
crisis, and the Sino-Soviet dispute of 1962 precipitated a
weakness in the Soviet leadership that the Rumanians exploited.
Floyd [15] points to the active opposition (led by Rumania)
during 1962-1963 to a Khruschev plan to use COMECON to coordin-
ate and direct the national economies of the members as a single
entity. It was during 1964 that the first outright defiance
of Moscow occurred when the RWP published "a Statement on the
Stand of the Rumanian Workers Party Concerning the Problems of
the World Communist and Working-Class Movement" . This document
publicly challenged the Soviet's proposal for establishment of
a Russian dominated economic empire with statements like
"The idea of a single planning body for all
COMECON countries has the most serious impli-
cations To hand over these levers to
the competence of some super-state or extra-
state bodies would be to turn sovereignty into
a concept without any real content." [10]
The Khruschev plan for integrating the economies of the
WTO countries was finally rejected at a summit meeting of COMECON
leaders in Moscow in July 1963. Floyd [15] calls it
"...a notable achievement on the part of the
Rumanians, for it was the first time, as far
as we know, that the Russians had been forced
to abandon a major line of policy in the com-
munist camp by what could be called peaceful
democratic means ." [15]
By 1963-1964 the Sino-Soviet dispute was at its height. The
Chinese challenge to Moscow focused on ideological differences
as well as territorial problems [14]. Up until 1962, Rumania
still publicly supported the Soviets and even withdrew its
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Ambassador from Albania when that country switched to the
Chinese camp [15], In 1963 a general warming to the Chinese
occurred and relations were re-established with Albania. As
the Sino-Soviet dispute grew in intensity, Rumania was care-
fully avoiding the anti-Chinese gestures occurring elsewhere
in Eastern Europe. In October 196 4, Khruschev was replaced,
no doubt caused by the erosion of power brought about by his
failures in the Berlin crisis, Cuban confrontation, the COMECON
plan, the "quiet" Rumanian revolt, and the great Communist
schism with the Chinese.
The Rumanian Plan for rapid industrialization continued with
increased trade with the West and a reduction of economic depen-
dence on CMEA countries. This induced Rumania to assert more
political independence which resulted in a growth of Rumanian
nationalism. By no means was Rumania rejecting Communism for
Capitalism, as harsh repressive actions were still common in
dealings with political enemies and dissidents, but the leader-
ship developed a "Rumanian First" philosophy that was
incompatible with the Soviet domination in previous years.
In March 1965 Gheorghiu-De j died and was succeeded by
Nicolae Ceausescu [14]. Gheorgiu-Dej was a shrewd politician
of considerable ability who walked a diplomatic tight-rope in
his skillful maneuvering with the Soviet Union. Ceausescu
and the top Rumanian leaders were with Gheorgiu-Dej from the
beginning in 1949 when the decision to transform Rumania into
an industrially independent nation was made. Ceausescu has
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continued in the manner of Gheorghiu-De j with outspoken expres-
sions of national sovereignty. Linden [10] categorizes these
expressions as 1) the existence of national differences in
building socialism and the right of each party to develop its
own policy; 2) the call for the abolition of military blocs
who are blamed for continuing international discord and the lack
of world peace, and 3) the responsibility of small and medium-
size states for producing and protecting world peace. This
statement rejects supranational decision making in favor of the
inviolable rights of national sovereignty. The subsequent
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 19 6 8 brought a sharp denunciation
by Ceausescu.
"The thesis that some are attempting to accredit,
of late, and according to which the joint defense
of the socialist countries against an imperialist
attack, would pre-suppose limitation or renunci-
ation of the sovereignty of any Treaty Member-
State, does not accord with the principles of
relationships between the socialist countries and
can by no means be accepted. Not only does member-
ship in the Warsaw Treaty not render questionable
the sovereignty of the member- countries , not only
does it not limit in any way their state indepen-
dence, but on the contrary, as provided for the
Treaty itself, it serves for strengthening the
independence and national sovereignty of each
state." [10]
The strong stand for national sovereignty and economic
independence resulted in strong popular support for the inter-
national stance of the Gheorgiu-Dej and Ceausescu regimes. This
and the strong anti-Russian feeling helped propel the Rumanian
leadership on its independent course.
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In summary, the overriding stimulus that induced the
Rumanian deviance was economic. There is general agreement
that Rumania did not want to remain in the Soviet-cast mold as
provider of agricultural products and raw materials to the
industrial CMEA countries. The strong nationalistic feeling
generated by the Rumanian leadership led to rejection of the
Soviet plan for supranational planning and control through
COMECON and propelled
;
Rumania on a rapid course of industrial
growth. No doubt the absence of Soviet troops in Rumania
enabled the assertion of independence but it was delicate poli-
tical maneuvering, shrewd economic logic and quiet diplomacy




HILDRETH-LU GRID SEARCH PROCEDURE [23]
The linear model, Equation G-l, requires certain basic
assumptions be true about the data.
1. The relationship between Y. and X. is approximately
linear.
2. The X. are nonstochastic variables whose values are
l
fixed.
3. The error terms e are N(0,a 2 ) and uncorrelated (i.e.,
E(e . ,e . ) = for i i j)
.
Y. = B, + B X. + e^ Equation G-i
l 1 2 l t —*
Under these assumptions the method of least-squares pro-
duces the best linear unbiased maximum likelihood estimators
.
When serial correlation is present, assumption three is vio-
lated, and we are not guaranteed that our estimators will be
unbiased MLE ' s . To correct for serial correlation we need to
compute the correlation between error terms and remove it from
the data. Equation G- 2 shows the correlation relationship
between error terms. Equation G-3 shows the generalized differ-
encing procedure where the linear model is altered by multiplying
by (1-p) so that error terms become independent (i.e., p is










where \T is N(0,.G 2 )
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and ECV. ,V.] = for i i j

















By construction, now the error term meets the requirements
of assumption three.
To test for the presence of serial correlation the Durbin
Watson Statistic listed below is computed.
dw = isl





We can now test the hypothesis as follows:
H : No serial correlation present.
o c
H , : Negative serial correlation present
Or
Positive serial correlation present.
a. 2 < DW < 4-d or d < DW < 2 ACCEPT H
u u o





d., and d are lower and upper limit values based on the
number of independent variables and the significance level
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The Hildreth-Lu procedure is an iterative grid search method
where values of p are specified within a range thought to con-
tain the true p. For each value of p the generalized differencing
described above is performed on the data until the minimum error
sum of squares (ESS) is observed. The p producing the minimum
ESS is optimal and is used in Equation G- 3 to adjust the data




(1 - p) + B
2
X
where Y^ = Y - pY+ .t t t-1
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